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ABSTRACT
Faihlre data from 16 commercia| spacecraft were analyzed to evalu-
ate failure trends, rellability growth, and effectiveness o_tests, The study
showed that the test programs were hlghiy effective in nnsuring a high level
of in-orblt reliability. There was only a single catastrophic problem In
44 years of in-orbit operation on [Z spacecraft, The results _Iso indicate
that in-orbit f_lure rates _re highly correlated with unit and systems test
failure rates. The data suggest that test effectiveness estimates could be
need to guicle the content o[ a test program to ensure that in-orbit reliability
goals are achieved. Cost considerations suggest that an aggressive eorrec-
tive action prugrarn to achieve a near-z, ero fad,lure rate for all testing should
be {n:plet]lented.
The unit an.d systems ieveiqu_lificat[on tests were found to be
marginally effective in detecting design deficiencies. Systems level v[bra-
tlon is an effective qualification test, Sygtems level tests are more effective
for qualification than for acceptance. Most vihration problems are detected
during qua[ificat[on tests or dlrlng unit acceptance. System acceptance
therma[ tests were marginaIIy effective, probably because of deficiencies in
test technique, Most them%a[ vacuum test is[lures are detected in the first
60 hours of testing,
Test effectiveness models can be used at unit and systems level to
estimate the defective population and to predict in-orbit or systems test
performance. The in-orbit cumulative failure rate has a constant slope
which implies a constant test effectiveness, The in-orbit failure rates
generally decrease _ith sttccessivc numbers of a spacecraft series, thus
indicating reliability growth. The systems test and in-orbit cumulative
failure rate data cannot be accurately combined into a single Duane plet
because the slopes are generally different,
The consequences o._ an in-orbit critical failure do not permit reduced
testing. The test program should be considered insurat_ce. The most cost
effective program is one in which a near-zero failure rate is achieved through
aggressiv,, corrective action. A continuing effort is warranted to measure
and improve the screening effectiveness of each test,
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1. OBJECTIVES
° .
The primary purpose of this study was a detailed analys_s of (ai]ure
reports spanning three commercial spacecraft pregrams to assess both test
screenin_ effectLvenese and reliability growth through el[ phases o_ space-
c_aft test and ln-o_rbit operation. In particular, data _rere co_lected and
analysed for a to[a! of 16 commercLal spacecraft with the following specific
obj e ¢tlve s :
1 ) Segregation of at[ failures and anomalLas by de,eat classification,
cause of failure, and the test envirora_ent
2) Identifies[ton of failure groupings and trends related to learalng
carves and/or design maturity
Qaaatttative assessmeat of the defect screealng effectiveness for
each unit, system, and in-orbit test phase, using the System
Test Effectiveness techniques'
4) Evaluatioa of the Duane Reliabilit7 Growth Analysis technitt te
to describe system test and in-orbit performance e,:,_
5) Development of recommendations for a cost eHectlve test
program
[
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*A. F. Timmins, "A Study of Relationship between Iaerforrnance in Systems
Tests and Space, " Proceedings of the Institute o_ Environmental Sciences
1,172, 1975
':':::J. T, Dnane, TIS Report UF6_MD00, General ELectric Company DCM&G
Department, E-rT1e,Pennsylvania, _:ebruary I96_
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2. APPROACH
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All failure reports for three commercial spacecraft programs (16
spacecraft) have been reviewed, categorized, and analyzed. These data
include in-house Trouble and Failure Reports {TFRs), International ]?allure
Reports (IFRs), and in-orbit problems as reported by customers. For
simplicity, each event shall herein be referred to as a failure report, or
FR, even though it should be noted that each FR does not necessarily repre-
sent a feature, since anomalies, problems, ir.termittents, wear-out, and
failures were all reported on the ERe.
A total of 1991 FRs and 90 orbit reports were corrected and coded.
Each FR was described on an 80 column format with 27 discrete pieces
information. Where missing or contradicting informaticn existed, altern,_e
sources (e.g., spacecraft logs) were utilized to correct and/or complete the
data. The dcscrlpt_on of the information codes catered in each column is
provided for reference in Appendix A.
Each of the Z081 data points was then evaluated in a boll< data analysis.
Various scrting and cross sorting provided information about overall test
performance and specific problem areas. The test tlmc to failure was
estimated for each of the systems test and in-orbit FRs. The thermal
vacuum test time to failure data were obtained directly from the respective
spacecraft log books.
The above data were used for the Duane analysis where the Systems
Te_t and in-orbit Duane plots were calculated for each spacecraft. The linear
regression coefficients were estimated, using the logsl0 of the cumulative
failure rates and test times. The combined systems test and in-orbit cnw-
ulatLve fat.lure rates were also plotted for indLvidua[ spacecraft.
The test effectiveness for specific test phases of initlal-ambient,
vibration, and thermal vacuum, at both unit and systems test levels, was
evaluated tn accordance with the Timmins Test Effectiveness Equation. The
test effectiveness cf the entire unit and systems test progratu was also
evaluated. In addition, the ability cf the qualification and early production
tests to detect design problems was analyzed. Thc use of test e_fectiveness
as a reliability prediction technique was developed. The attr,ibutes of a cost
effective test plan were developed.
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3. FAILURE DATA BASE
3. I DATA BASE SUMMARY
The failures and anom_lles wh__ch comprise the data 5a._e are
distributed through the various test and in-orbit phases of three commercial
programs. The quantities of spacecraft for each program are summarized
in Table 3-1, The relative scheduling of these programs is shown in
Figure 3- I.
Program 1 consisted of two separate contracts. The first (A) was
for a prototype and four flight spacecraft and the second (B} was for four
addit).onal flight spacecraft. Of the seven spacecraft successfully launched,
six arc stilt in service and have accumulated _ver ZS, 6 wears of orbital
life. The one orbital failure occurred in the payload subsystem of the
second flight spacecraft (F-2). and resulted inn degradation of performance
to onacceptable levels ior comlnercial communications traffic. Program Z
was essentially a _caled dcwn version of Program i, both in payload and
size. It utiliz_J many of the same or similar units, although it introduced
sot_e new payload concepts. All three flight spacecraf[ were successfully
launched and are in service. Program 3 was a new contract utilizing the
Program
TABLE 3-1. PROGRAM SUMMARY
Spacecraft Quantities
1A Protot,/pe + four flight
I 8 Fou r flight
2 Prototype + three flight
3 Three flight + one payload
shaft
Total for a_l Two prototype
pr )grams Fourteen flight
One payload s_eft
"F 6 was launched but t_ooster failed.
In.Orbit
Number _Ye_rs
4 18.16
3' 10.52
3 9.99
2"" fi.27
12 43.g4
Rem_d<s
t.ar_ comm, u_ic_tiol_s t3t_t_
Separate buy of same spacecraft
Scaled down version of Program 1
Follow.on contract to Program 2
Average of 3-2/3 years per
spacecraft
' "F,6 has not been launched, and the shah has not. bean integr sled to provide a spacecraft.
START OF FROTOTYPE SYSTEMS TEST]
PROGRAM 1 F,2 F.3 F4 F.5 S.? F_ F-5 F+I
START OF PROTOTYPE SYSTEMS TEST
PROGRAM :2 F_I F_Z _i
_ LAUNCH
I
PROGRAM S 1=,4 F.S F-IS p
SHELF
I I I I I I I I
2 3 4 S 5 ? 8 S
'J'IME, YEARS
FIGURE 3-1. RELATIVE PROGRAM SCHEDULES FOR SYSTEMS TEST AND LAUNCH
J..'
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same basic spacecraft as Program 2, Therefore, the three flight spacecraft
were considered equlvsient to a follow-on buy and were sequentially num-
bered, beginning with F-4. No prototype spacecraft was fabricated or
tested for this program. A payload equipment shelf was additlonally inte-
grated with its respective units. Only two of the spacecraft have been
launched, and the shelf has not been integrated i.nto a spacecraft. Both of
the launched spacecraft are in service.
The data base for this study includes ai[ failure reports (FRs) gener-
ated on Program 1 from its contractual start date through the last launch
(F-l). All FRs to date on Programs 2 and 3 are included. All orbit anox_lally
reports to date (March 1, 1977) by the respective customers are also included.
These reflect a total of almost 44 orbit years accumulated on the 12 space-
craft in orbit.
Because of the dlffcrcnces betwccn programs in failure reporting
methods at the lower levels of assembly, data were counted, but not
analyzed, for FRs below unit level. For this study, a unit was defined as
an identifiable (by serial number) piece, or pieces, of hardware which
were formally acceptance tested either by a vendor or by Hughes Aircraft.
These could and did include some major subassemblies which wcrc
delivered and then integrated to form a larger assembly (unit) and
acceptance tested again prior to delivery to the spacecraft for integration.
An example of this was the high power traveling wave tube amplifier (TWTA)
unit. It consists of two major subassemblies: an electronic_ power controller
and the _raveling wave tube. Each o£thcse was acceptance tested and
delivered by th(- respective vendors and then integrated to form the TWTA
and acceptance tested again. Each o_these was considered to be a unit
for this study. Serial numbers of each were tracked b] the configuration
management system. Each suba3sernbl7 could be removed as a unit and
reintegratcd to form a different unit as test and performance results
required.
I
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To assess the relative complexity of each of the programs, Table 3-2
summarizes both th; types and quantities of units which comprised a given
flight spacecraft. ,'he data are di_,ided into eight different subsystems for
each spacecraft and the number of mechanical units is also ideetitied for each
subsystem. A normalization factor was calculated, based on number of
units per spacecraft, by using Program 1 as the reference. Another way to
compare the complexity of programs is through the use of electronics parts
count. Table 3.3 presents this data. It was concluded that values of 2.50
for Program Z and Z. 44 for Program 3 should be used when data required
normalization for program to program comparisons. This was derived by
use of a weighted average using 3 for electronics parts complexity, Z for
total units, and l for types of units.
All FRs were divided into five distinct groups by ha rdwa re develop-
ment phase: eubunit, unit) systems test) orbit, or not applicable. The
distinction between subunits and units has been previously discussed.
_ysterlas test level was defined to begin at delivery of units to the spacecraft
and continue through launch of each spacecraft, including these testa per-
formed at launch base. After review of each FR) a small nt, mbcr were
TABLE 3-2. UNIT TYPES AND QUANTITIES
Unit Types
Total unit types per spacecraft subsystem
Communications
Antenna
Telemetry and commend
Propulsion
Power
Structure
Attitude control
Apogee kick motor
Tutal
Total units per spacecraft subsystem
Communications
Antenna
Telemetry and command
Propulsion
Power
Structural
Attitude control
Apogee kick motor
Total
Normalization factor by unit types
Normalization factor by total units
Notes:
Program 1
42
12(11)
35(9)
10(4)
13
22(6)
7(1)
3(1)
144(33)
246
18(17)
62(10)
75(18)(3)
26
26(11)
2(3)
3(1)
468(60)
1(reference)
l(referencel
Program2 Program3
8(2) (1) 8(2) (1)
5(5) 5(1)
3(1) 3(1)
5(1) 5(1)
6 6
15(3) 17(3)
8(3) g(3)
2(1) 2(1)
52(16) 55(16)
53(1) (2) 53(1) (2)
5(5) 5(5)
4(1) 4(1)
10(2) 10(2)
21 21
43(3) (4) 46(3) (4)
12(5) 13(G)
2(1) 2(1)
150(18) 154(18)
2,77 2,62
3,12 3,04
( ) = Number of mechanical units with no electronics or electrical hardware.
(1) Does not include 17 receiver unit parts that were included (tracked) on
Program 1
(2) Because of (I), 25 receiver unitswere not included
(3) Includes 42 tracked heater elements
(4) Includes 28 tracked temperature sensors
TABLE 3,3. ELECTRONIC PARTS COUNT PER SPACECRAFT
Number of electronic parts
Normalization factor
Program 1 Program 2 Program 3
16,846 8.370 8,669
t(reference) 2.01 1.07""
3-4
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excluded from the data base for one of the following reasons: l) it was not
written against spacecraft hardwar _. (e. g. , test equipment malfunction
which had tm effect on spacecraft hardware or the test program), 2) it was
a duplicate of another FR documenting the same problem but originating
in a different area, and/or 3) the original FH or copies of the FR could not
be found in the files-to-enable-coding.
A summary of total data base is presented in Table 3-4. The FRs
which form a basis for the analytlcal study are shown within the heavy line
box. Table 3-5 presents the same data as a percentage of the whole, by
program, Of interest is the increasing effectiveness of the subunit level
tests on each program with the systems test level decreasing and the unit
test level remaining relatively constant. This is probably the result of
both varyfing FR reporting criteria on each program and a [earning process
whereby the subunit testing became more effective in screening problems.
The fact that so few FRs were present on Program 3 at systems test level
TABLE 3.4. NUMERICAL SUMMARY OF SULK DATA
Program
1
2
3
Total
Number of Spacecraft
8 * prototype
3 ÷ prototype
3 ÷ shelf
14 flight + 2 prototype + 1 shelf
Total FRs
Reviewed Subunit
.426 286
355 104
300 98
2,081 48B
*l¢_¢ludes duplicates, not. spacecraft h_rdware problems, etc.
Level of FRs
Sys_s
Unit Test In-Orbit
721 263 68
177 42 13
160 18 g
t,058 3 ^ 90
_let °
Applicable
88
19
15
122
TABLE 3-5. PERCENTAGE SUMMARY OF BULK DATA
Program
1
2
3
Average
T .....
Number of Spacecraft
Total FRs
Reviewed
100
f00
100
100
8 • prototype
3 _ prototype
3 ÷ shelf
14 flight _2 prototype * 1 shelf
Level of FRs
Systems
5ubunit I Unit Test
I
20.0 ' 50.5 "=8.4
29.3 49.9 l1.8
32,7 _.3 6,0/
23.5 50.8 J t55
"Includes duplicates, not spacecraft hardware problems, etc.
In-Orbit
4.B
3.7
30
43
NOt"
Applicable
5.4
5.0
5.g
= -- _
_i8, and 6 of these were induced) requires Further investigation. The higher
percentage of systems test level FRs on Program 1 is also a result o_
smaller speeificat_.on r_argina than those imposed on Programs Z or 3.
As indicated in Table 3-4, there was a large difference in the number
of F'Rs between programs, with Program l having abotlt twice as many FRs
per spacecraft as Program 3. However, normalized data based either on
ete¢tronic parts count or on hardware differences is tess disparate. The
normalized data are summarized in Table 3-6. For the three spacecraft
programs, approximately one FR was generated for each 127 electronic
parts. Note that the apparent low FP, average ofPrograr_s Z and ] becomes
a high average when normalized on the basis o_ hard,rare dif![erences. Nor-
malized FR rates must be used to rationally compare any two spacecraft
programs.
As discussed, many of the units utilized o_ each of the three pro-
gr_ms were aupo[ied to Htghes AircraFt Compauy hy veRclo_s wkich were
primarily international companies in France, Canada, Japan, England,
Italy, etc, Unit data were separated into international and Hughes categories.
based on the reporting activity. This was carried, as a subd_vlslon of unit
FRs, through part of the bath data analysis to determine any significant
diFfer'roses in problem categories between the two methods of procurement,
A su_nr_aary of the division is presented in Table $-7.
i
V
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TABLE 3.6. FAILURE REPORT RATES COMPARISON
8 + prototype"
3 + orototyOe °
3 + ,hell *
-T5,5
Total Unit [
Number of Systems, and |
Orograrn Speeecreft In-Orbit FRs |
", ,.,;0
2 251 ]
3 202
Combined 1,593
"Eacll of these _ % Of a spaceerMt
Etsctronic Parts
per FR
125.6
116.7
148.4
121.1
FR Average Normalization
per Spacecraft Factor
134.1 I (reference}
71.7 2,50
51.7 2,44
102.7 1.67
I
Normalized F R
Average per
Spacecraft
134.1
179.25
140.79
171.61
Program Hughes
1 348(48)
2 63(36)
3 _61101
Tmal _,2"](409
TABLE 3-7. HUGHES VERSUS INTERNATIONAL
FAILURE REPORTS
= .......
Unit Failure Rep_rt_, ° [
Ioternatio_al !
373(52)
! 14(64)
144_90_
._6!.'°!_J
"Percentage shown in parentheses
/olat
721( 1OO}
i
t 177(100)
[ 160(1OQ1
1,058( 100_
I
I
1
I
3.2 FAILURE REPORT CATEGORIES
Two basic breakdowns of the IZRs were required to effectively
present and analyze the data. A distinction between FRs on the qualification
(prototype) and acceptance {flight) spacecraft was made to distinguish between
:hedlfferent test programs. The second breakdown was one of "importance"
for each of the two data sets. A significant number (about 20 perce_3t) of all
the FRs "integration and/or test" (I&T} induced. These were not the fault
of the hard,care, but were the result oEbuman errors and required unit or
system rework. Some (about 11 percent) of all the FRs were seconctary in
nature, in *.hat although FRs were initiated, no resultant pbyni,:al hardware
action was taken. A third distinction (about [ percent) way made for FRs
initiated against hardware for an anomaly which could not be repeated. All
remaining FRs {about 68 percent) were classified as primary and were
included in the analysis data base. A su_rnmar V of these several categories
is presented in Tables 3-8, 3-9, and 3-10 for ;uternational units, Ilughes
produced units, and systems level test FRs, respectively, for both quali-
fication and acceptance hardware.
Essentiailg, all qualification hardvcare was produced at Hughes for
the two prol:otype spacecraft. Tables 3-8 and 3-9 show that a significantly
higher nurn=er of secondary FRs were generated internationally; 64 percent
were for out-of-specification conditions with an retest/rework required.
This is probably a result of the formal contractual interface between llughes
and these subcontractocs with regard to out-of-specification conditions.
Beth Hughes and international uldt test results showed that electrical
test erro::s caused about 41 percent of the I_.T induced FRs, and electrical
test overstress caused another Z4 percent. Hardware mishandling accounted
for an additional 12 percent, it is prebable that mcreas_'d emphasis ¢,, test
procedures and safety practices, both electrical and mechanical, would have
been cost effective,
System test FRs are summarized in Table 3-10. A total of 31 per-
cent of all FP,.* on Programs i and 2 were against the prototype hardware.
The I&.T induced failure -ate remained about constant at 23 percent on all
programs :or prototype or flight hardware. The susceptibility of t_rograrn I
to propulsion subsystem line heater damage is apparent, llarclve_ro handling
problems and electrical test errors were significant on all pr¢_grams. The
small nun,act of primary FRs at the svztems l.evel on Programs 2 and ]
makes significant analysis difficult. IIowever, the fact that the sample
size is so srn_l[ is a credit to the effectiveness of the sub'anit and unit test
programs. The reduction in secondary out-of-specification a_d test error
problems on °re, rams 2 and 3, relative to Program l, probably reflects
more mature systems test procedures anti specifications requirements an
a result of experience gained on the first program. It should be notetl that
the syster_as test teams were derived frona the same organization oa all three
programs.
Tr
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TABLE 3.8. FAILURE REPORTCATEGORIES - INTERNATIONAL UNITS
FR Type
Totals
Qu=li float ionta¢cep tance 2(1 )
breakdown
Less secondary 0
Less I&T induced 1(50)
Less anomalies 0
TORSI primary 1(50)
Secondary reasons
Out of spe¢/OK
Mea$ teehjNo retest
Test equip/No retest
Mfg error/multiples
Test error/No rework
Anomalies/No retest
Misc/No retest
Total secondary 0
Program*
1 2
OusiificationlAccent=nee
3?3
371(99)
25(?)
52(i7)
0
284(77)
Qgallfieation AcCeptance
t14
2(2) 112(98)
0 3_[31)
0 12(11)
0 0
2(100) 65158)
3
_¢¢eptance
144
144
42129)
25(17)
0
??it.-4)
20 17 28
0 7 4
1 5 1
1 0 0
3 6 9
0 O 0
0 0 0
25 0 35 42'
Sum
of all
Programs
031
.°o
102(16)
100(16)
0
429(68}
65(64)
11(11)
7(7)
1(1)
18118)
-0
0
102(100)
I&T induced reasons
Damaged wires, heaters, ? I 1 9(g)
ere+
Ete¢ test overstress 1 ? 2 7 26(26)
Elec rust errop 30 4 9 43(43)
Hardware handling 1 5 2 2 10t10)
Wron 9 environment 1 -- _ 6 10( 101
imposed
Bad part selectior in 2 0 0 2(2)
test
RC5 test error 0 0 0 0
Test fi_+ule induced 0 0 0 0
Total I_T induce'J 1 52 0 12 25 100(100)
*Percentage shown in oare_these!; the data have not been norm=liz_d
i
/
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TABLE 3-9, FALLURE REPORT CATEGORIES- HUGHES UNITS
FR Type
0 5(2) O 5115) 5tSb} 15(4)
Q(22_ 72(23_ 8(28) 11(32I 4(25} 104(_4)
0 0 0 0 0
32(78} 230(75_ 21(72) 18(fi3} 4(25} 305(72}
3 1 4122)
0
0
7 7(39)
1 1(61
2 2 4(22]
2 2(1_1
5 0 5 "8 18(150
4 0 5 0
0 4 1 0
t 1 '_ 3
4 2 3 t
0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
I 0 0 1 0
! 9 8 f_ 4
"Percentage shown in parentheses; the da(a havll-not-t)N_Ormallzed
t
t
111
TABLE 3-10. FAILURE REPORTCATEGORIES-SYSTEM TEST
FR Type
Totals
Quati(icationlaCcept 85(321
breakdown
PrOgram*
1 2 3 Sum
of all
Quldificstlon [Ao_'eptllnce Qualification [A¢ceptarlCe Acceptance Programs
263 42 18 323
178(68| 12(29l 30(?ti 18 - - -
20(ttl O 1(3) 2(111 29(91
38(21l 3(25) 8(27) 6{33) 74{23)
10(61 0 0 0 10(3)
110(62) 9(75) 21(70) 10156) 210(65)
Le_ secQndary 6(?)
Less I&T induced 19(22)
Less anomaliel 0
Total primary 60(71 )
Secondary reasons
Out of stOec/OK 0
Mias, tech/No retest 0
Test eqLHp/No retest 0
Mfg error/multiples 0
Test error/No rework 2
Anomalies/No relest 0
Misc/No retest 4
11 11(38)
0 0
0 0
0 2 217)
8 10(34)
0 t 1(4)
I 5(17)
t
0 -I I 2 29(100)TolalSecondary 6 20
13
2
9
13
I
0
O
0
}_T induced reasons
Damaged wires, heater¢, 12
eIC.
I=re¢ test overst[l_ 0
Ete_ felt error 4
Hmrd_are ha_dlin 9 3
Wr_ln_ environment 0
impose0
Bed pltrt selection in 0
test
RCS test error 0
Tes[ fixlure in_10¢ed O
T._..oootal,..&&&T induced_.. _ . J 19
tpercent_fle shown in parer;thesesf
38
O I 2
0 2 I
2 1 2
t 2 1
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 2 0
3 8
i....
the dote h_ve n_l Deen normalized
28(38)
5(7)
18(24t
20(271
I(II
0
0
2(3)
74{100)
3-10
t!
!
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3.3 TEST SCREEN EFFECTIVITY
The primary data base was sorted by test activity to determine the
origin of each FIL This sort reveals the screening effectivity of each
test environment at each phase of development, When combined with the
in-orbit results, these data become the basis for the evaluation of the two
analytical methods presented in Sections 4 and 5 of this report.
Tables 3-11 and 3-1Z present the respective numerical data sorts
for qualification and _eceptance test screens by hardware level and program.
Table 3-11 shows a surprisingly high systems level FR rate (i.e., systems
level FRs/all FRs) for Program 1 prototype spacecraft of 04.5 percent,
The Program g prototype spacecraft FR rate of 28, 1 percent was more
reasonable, even though based on a small sample size. However, these
FR rates are both high when contrasted to the systems level acceptance FR
rates of 17.6, 20.2, and 11,0 percent for Programs 1, 2, and 3, respec-
t[vet y. The disproportionate systems levei FR rate for prototype space-
craft may be the result of a higher screening e_fectiveness at the systems
level for qualification (design?) problems,
Particular. environments within a test phase are discernible from
Tables 3-11 and 3-12. For allvibration tests, Z (longitudinal) and X (lat-
eral) axes were more effective than Y (lateral) with 30, 26, and 12 FRs
detected at each axis, respectively; but 32 percent of the total of 1Ol vibra-
ticn test FRs did not indicate the axis of importancep most of those having
been originated at Hughes, Both hot (ZZ) and cold (16) temperatures were
important to allthe unit thermal vacuum (TV) tests, with eclipse simulation
being particularly important to the spacecraft systems level, resulting in
lAof the 29 TV FRs (48 percent}. Note that the cold phase of"despun
compartment" or "electronic shelf" TV (DCTV/ESTV) simulates an extended
eclipse condition and was therefore included, The unit thermal cycle test
environment indicated no strong preference as to where FRs occurrc(t.
The data of Tables 3-11 and 3-12 were grouped and distributed by
spacecraft assignment to understand tho significance of the test screen
dlstributlonand to look for trends, This is presented on Figt:res 3-2 and
3-3 for the unit and systems level test screens. The four groupings chosen
for unit screens were: I) initial assembly, inspection and performance
tests, 2) vibration and post vibration performance test (SPT), 3) _hermai
vacuum and/or thermal cycling and the Kna_ inspection and performance test,
and 4) performance tests which were not defined as to specifics and all
reaction control subsystcw (RCS) tests. For the systems level test screens,
the four chosen groupings of FRs were: 1) initialassembly, inte_ratlon, and
integrated systems tests (IST), 2) vibration and SPT, 3) all TV tests (DCTV/
ESTV and spacecraft TV) and the final IST and inspection, anti, 4) all launch
operations. Those units which were not assigned to a spacecraft were
carried as a separate spacecraft _rouping to enable analysis.
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TABLE 3,11, QUALIFICATION TEST SCREEN - NUMERIC
Oualification
TeSt
Screen
In;tial inspection
Meeheni¢al mfg.
)nit)a) e)ec, per|. tl+=_t
Perf. test - not identified
Fir=el alec. Derf. tttt
Program I Program 2
Inlerna, Hughes System| Interne- Hughes
tiono_ Unlit Units LeVel flonol Unitl Units
? 2
3 3
I I1 5 2 4 1
4 6
2
TrsnsitioA
STV/ESTV Hot
Cold (eclipsl)
Initial IST
Setu_
Not defined 3
Vibration , X.axis 1
Y- axis,
Z,axis I
SPT (post vibrstion) 2
• Hot 1
I Cold
TV/STV
i Edipse simulelion
Utkn or tr0n_ition
I Unk n¢_'vnThermal Transition
cycle [ HotC_d 4
Final |ST
Final inspection I
RCS tc_t$ I
I
2
e
2
4
10
I
riO (64,5)Subtotal ' I ll.0) 3_ (34,4) 2 (_.3t 21 (65.6}
Total 93 3:2
1
I 5
+Percentage shOS_n in parenthe_s; (he d_ta hav[e not been normidi_ed
Systems
Lever
1
9 t2811
Total
9
6
24
10
2
1
1
12
I
6
8
2
8
18
t
5
1
1
4
I
2
I
12_
125
3-12
(I
l
1
f
TABLE 3.12, ACCEPI'ANCE TEST SCREEN - NUMERIC
A_SpISNCe
Test
Screen
Initial _nsp_ction
Mechallica mlg
Illttial elec, per(, [el!
Perl, rust nol identihcd
Final el_c, llerl, lest
{ TIan$1t Jo'_
OCTV/E$ rv Hot
Initial I_1'
_etup 11Old_lJ n¢'¢1
Vlb[al JOe { X-oxi_Unit •fart(Iron
and rarl_om I
_.axl$
$PT IPost vihrat ionl
H_t
C_ld
TV/_TV E¢1J!_3¢sir'nulal ion
Unk. or tlanslt_n
/ k}n_no_
1.he/rflsI CVCI_ TI alllit[Qit
Hot
Final 151"
Finil hlSDL_ti_n
RCS tests
Launch oPelallOnS
Subtotals"
Total
Program ]
(ntel- )
natio_=l Hughes Systems
Units Uni s Level
...... t1__
5 6 9
1 3 3
113 85 21
68 23
4 5
"<\J 3
1 24
10 6
3 5
4 14 I
16 6 2
II 9 1
4 1 2
- S
2 1 t
I 2 -
14 11 -
28 10 -
- 10
12
_ _- 19
2B4 _30 _ 110
(45.9) (369} (17.6)
g34
Intel-
nsti0nil
Units
34
I1
J
l
I
2
2
6
3
Program 2
3
4
-L- 26S 1B
(62_l
104
Hughes I Systems
Units Level
1
1 I
4 3
8
/ 2
/
4
1
I
!
4
3
2_
"Porte _e _ OWn J_dev thc_s, Ihu data flare not D_(?II _tOXJ.allT_Zl
Proglsm 3
Imter.
n.t;on.II HuShes
Units J Units
1
31
30 I 1
4 !
5
3
1
1
8
77 4
(946) (4 41
9;
Systll'_S
Level otal
9 21
3 12
131
tl
3
3
27
18
10
24
3 37
32
7
9
4
28
54
1 15
7
I0 815
II!.ol is_ /_J.
i
1
l
Figures 3-2 and 3-3 show a number of significant features about the
primary data base. Program 1 was generally more uniformly distributed
within each test group than were Programs 2 or 3, This is probably the
resolt of the larger sample size. At the unit level, at least 4Z percent of
all FRs were found in group ] -- initial assembly and performance check-
out. Some of group 4 (unde£:ned performance test) undoubtedly belong in
group I; therefore, the initial assembly and performance test is the most
important phase for test screening at the unit level. Vibration (group 2)
is tess effective (15 percent) than thermal (21 percent) tests (group 3) on all
programs and about 21 percent of all unit FRs were in group 4 -= undefined
performance. Within the unit groupings, the qualification data are not sig-
nificantly different from acceptance. Qualification vibration was somewhat
more effective than acceptance {21 percent of all qualification FRs versus
17. 5 percent of all Program l FRs and 17 percent versus 8 percent for ail
Program 3). Thermal testing was somewhat less effective at qualification
(18 percent versus 21 percent for Program l}. However, this difference was
very pronounced at the systems level. Almost 42 percent (Program l) and
55 percent (Program 2) of the respective prototype spacecraft FRs occurred
in vibration. This contrasts to 16 and 20 percent overall and only 3 and
10 percent without prototype spacecraft FRs. Therefore, vibration and
SPT were very imports, nt for systems level qualification (prototype spa _e-
craft) but were significantly less effective screens for systems level
acceptance (flight spacecraft}. Systems level TV tests were more effective
for the flight spacecraft than for the prototype ,;pacecraft.
Figure 3-2 shows that as the unit tests screens mature with time, the
effectiveness of the initial ambient tests remains constant at about 41 per-
cent. Unit vibration generally trends downward with each successive
spacecraft and program, and thermal test grouping trends upward in
importance. The percentage of undefined unit performance tests (group 4)
trends upward (19 percent on Program l to 27 percent on Program 3),
indicating that attention to detaii on the FRs waned with each successive
program. It should also be noted from Table 3-7 that the percentage of
foreign participation also increased with each successive program. The
high percentage of group 4 for the F-4 and F-5 assigned units from Pro-
gram 3 makes the Program 3 evaluation difficult. By comparison with
Program 3 F-6 assigned units, where a high percentage is assigned to
group 1 (59 percent) with a corresponding tow group 4, one could conclude
tlmt the vast majority of group 4 Program 3 FRs actually occurred during
initial checkout and the 44 percent overall group 1 value is very conservative.
At the systems level the initial assembly integration and IST (group I)
tests are again very effective: 50, 33, and 50 percent for Programs l, 2,
and 3, respectively, and 48 percent overall.
The systems level sine and random spacecraft vibration tests
produced only 1 FR during acceptance (Z sine), and five FRs were additionally
reported after the vibrational environment during the Systems Perforrnance
Test (SPT).
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Figure 3-3 shows that an increase in Program Z systems level TV
occurred with a corresponding decrease in the initial {group II screening.
The data shows that this may have been caused by both inadequate unit
thermai testing (Figure 3-Z Group 3) and systems level initial performance
testing (Group l of Figure 3-3).
Figure 3-3 also shows that all of the launch operations FRs occurred
on Program I. The first spacecraft launched on Program l (the F-2) had
11 FRs generated during launch operations. Although FRs continued to be
generated against succeeding spacecraft, they accrued at an average of just
over l per spacecraft. During the five launch operations of Programs 2 and
3 no FRs occurred. This is probably thu result of a mature test program
with proven procedures. It should he noted that the F-I spacecraft of
Program I was unique in that after the spacecraft systems level tests were
completed it was stored and not launched. After all other spacecraft on
Program I were tested, F-I was returned to Hughes, upgraded with the
latest configurations (a few design changes) and then again put ).hrough a
systems level spacecraft test program prior to shipment to the launch base
for launch.
Table 3-13 was prepared, using the data for the systems level
acceptance test screens of Table 3-12. It distributes the FRs by spacecraft
sets of all, initial (F-l), all remaining, and F-i retest forProgram i into
three new groupings: I) pre-spacecra[t environment; 2) spacecraft environ-
ment {vibration and TV); and 3) launch operations. As can be seen from
TABLE 3-13. SPACECRAFT SYSTEMS LEVEL TEST SCRE ENS 8Y SPACECRAFT
Proof am _
All
Total,
Systems Level Acceptance Test Space-
Group Screen by Spac_nraft craft
InLliai elactrica_ anS ¢'nech anica_
as_mbly and Performance _
1 DeTV/ESTV 5
iniliai iST 27
Vibration 1
I SPT 22 I
TV/STV 9
Final IST and m_pechon 14
3 Launch operations lg
I
TOtal 1 10
#t',_rtt_ f_.r spacecraft _. __ !
"Shelf Oata not mclude_l ((wo FR$)
1
F.2
P-1 I Ihrough
$oace• t F.6
cr.tft Space-
Original cra:t
9 21
0 5
S " 19
- )
0 I 1 [ O
' ' 1 l 0
0 I S :
3 I 9 2
F-I Total,
Space- All
craft Space-
Retest craft
3 4
0 S
2 4
0
t
0
6
B
1,,.I ,.. N/A o
-- F .........
31 I "/2 8 21
3: I 10.3 S
L __ ____
F-I
Space-
craf!
4
3
1
0
1
0
4
0
t3
t3
°*F-? was :st sl_dcPcI,_ft t_unched, thgrl_lore, P.2 Idurtch tlpet_lll()_l _ F[;_$ Were aebttf_tii;y as$1qn_{I to
vice v@r_t
e_-6 $pJtec_,¢lf h,15 nc_t as y_f t)¢_n te_t_S
4"Dat_ have not been nornlahzed.
2
F-2 and
F-3
s I
Totals.
All i
Space- Space- Icr ft cleft
- I
0 2" I
;
a io
3 ! I i
o ' o J
1
0 2
0 i 0""i
I
i I
P 1%ti(l('P(fdft ,Irld
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such a grouping and distribution, there is a significant distinction in FR
observations after the initial spacecraft of the two different test programs;
note that Program 3 is considered as a follow*on to Program 2. Both F-l
spaeecraf_ had three times as many problems as the average of succeeding
spacecraft. The F-I spacecraft retest problems of Program } provide
unique evidence that the initial F- I spacecraft test program was not a totally
elfactive screen.
3.4 DEFECTS ANALYS:S
Each primary FR was divided into four categories according to the
cause of failure: I) workmanship, Z) part, 3) design, and 4) unknown.
The results of this division by level of assembly and assigned spacecraft
fnr eitch program are shown on Figures 3-4 and 3-6. The unit and systems
level FR_. are shown as a function of the assigned spacecraft. Where an FR
occurred on a unit which was not eventually assigned to a spacecrafG it
was classified as "not assigned. " The relationship of international and
Hughes unit rRs was rr_intained, Integration and t_st (I&T) FRs and th@
anorr_iy b_Rs were also added.
The figures show the downward trend from early to late spacecraft
in the numbers of FRs occurring during a given spacecraft acceptance test
pzogram, An estimate of this trend is presented on each figure wherein
the averages for the first set of spacecraft and the last set are calculated
and a two point line is drawn. These averages included an appertioned
number of the unassigned FRs.
With the few exceptions, each set of spacecraft e_hiblts the property
that the last spacecraft units have a higher FR rate than the trend of the
previotts spacecraft units in that set. A probable expLanatton is that the
problem units from each set of spacecraft are eventually _ssigne_ to the
last spacecraft in t_lat set. Units would be delaFed in their prodoctiotl
sequence to allow "repair" and would reenter the acceptance cycle later in
time, resulting in late Spacecraft assignment.
At the systems level, both F-_ spacecraft eXhibited relatively low
FR rates, £ngeneral, workmanship, part, and design FRs were all tower
when compared to the preceding spacecraR (F-l) and the following space-
craft (F-3I. No viable exptanationis apparent, It should 5e noted that-the
systems level data of the F-1 spacecraft of Program t is a combination of
FIRs from two cot_plete systems test sequences and the FRs which occurred
onthe F-Z spaeecraR during launch operations (the F-i s!>acecraft launch
operaOons problems ware arbitrarily assigned to the F-2 spacecraft), AS
state(| earlier, the F-2 spacecraft was the first launched and had an
abnormal amount _f difficulty during the [_unch operations, most nf which
were because of the "first time" experience.
The d_ta from Figures 3-4 and 3-5 have been redrawn _n Figar_ 3-6
in the form of frequency charts, A clearer picture of the spacecraft tn
spacecraft relationships can be achieved for Program l an,} Programs Z and
3, respectively. The not assigned FRs have been apportioned betwe._ the
spacecraft sets.
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The apparent reduced effectiveness of the qualification test program
is due in part to the fact that the equipment complement was ont 7 approxi-
mately 50 percent of a flight spacecraft. However, it is evident that the
Program l systems test environment was significantly more effective as a
qualification test screen than the unit test environment. The data also
indicates that the design defects were not adequately screened during quali-
fication environments, and significant numbers of design problems were
revealed in subsequent flight spacecraft acceptance tests.
As might be expected, workmanship FRs are the largest single
category in the data base at both test levels for all three programs and for
almost every flight spacecraft. The shifting of problems to the last space-
craft in an 7 set is clearly evident for workmanship FRs (see F-4 and F-8
spacecraft for Program 1, F-3 spacecraft for Program 2, and F-6 space-
craft for Program 3). Overall, the trend toward reduced numbers of FRs
with each progressive spacecraft is consistent, with the except£on of the
workmanship FRs which trend upward for the last spacecraft in each set.
The second most important category of acceptance FRs was the I&_T
induced group. These iVRs were significantly high for each spacecraft, For
the later spacecraft at the systems level there were almost as many I&T
induced failures and problems as the test program revealed in the space-
craft hardware.
Defective part problems occurred throughout the acceptance test
programs and did not appear to be affected by spacecraft number or test
maturity.
Design FRs followed the expected downward trend, but not to the degree
one would expect. The initial spacecraft of each program revealed substantial
numbers of design defects {despite the qualification program) which decayed
to a relatively constant rate for Program 1 from the 4th to tile 8th spacecraft,
The F-4 spacecraft did involve some new designs on Program 3; this resulted
in a new start of this design FR decay process.
The similarity of data from program to program was verified by the
use of tile normalization factors presented above. When the primary data
is sorted and divided by the number of spacecraft witllin the _eg as appro-
priate, and Lheu normalized, the results are as shown on Tables 3- 14 and
3-15 for qualification and acceptance. Program l qualification FRs are
similar to Program 2. The same is true of the FR per spacecraft average
of the first flight spacecraft set for Programs I and 2. The last four space-
craft on Program l (set IB) was almost identical in Fbls per spacecraft to
I_rogram 3. In summary, the data, although derived from three different
programs, is consistent when normalized for either qualification or
acceptance. Therefore, it was concluded that program and level of develop-
ment distinctions are not necessary for ]dR defect analysis purpc_ses.
Table 3-16 shows a summary of all primary FRs by cause. Design
FRs accounted for almost 50 percent of all qualification FRs, but only
16.7 percent of the acceptance group. Workmanship accounted for 51.4 per-
cent of the acceptance FRs and 35, a percent of the qualification group.
Summaries segregated by the cause of failure arc shown in Tables 3-17,
3-1_, and 3-19 for worklnanship, part, anti design defect tyw,s , rvspectiwdy.
]- -'7
1TABLE 3-14. NORMALIZED PRIMARY QUALIFICATION
DATA BASE BY SPACECRAFT
Normalization factor
Raw data:
Unit
Systems level
Normalized d|ta:
Unit
Systems level
Total
Program
1 2
1 (ref.) 2.60
33 23
@0 B
33 57.6
60 22,5
93 79,0
TABLE 3-15. NORMALIZED PRIMARY ACCEPTANCE DATA BASE BY SPACECRAFT
Number of spacecraft
1A
4
Normalization factor 1 (ref)
76.5
16.75
78,5
16.75
Raw data,tspecgoreft:
Unit
Systems level
Normalized data/spacecraft:
Unit
Systems level
Program
1B 2
4 3
1 (ref) 2.50
520 27.67
10,75 7.0
52.0 69.18
10.75 17,50
82,75 86.68
Unit: 3½*
System: 3
2,44
23.14
2,67
56.46
6,61
Total 93,25 62.97
"Shelf units _ _/_of a spacecraft
TABLE 3-t6. ALL PRIMARY FAILURE REPORTS BY CAUSE
Qualification Acceptance
FR
Type
Workmanship
Part
Design
Unknown
Total
Percent of
Quantity Total
4 35.2
16 12.B
62 49.6
3 2.4
125
Quantity
421
236
137
23
819
Percent of
Total
51,4
29,1
16.7
2.8
_-Z8
J_
I
I
II
l
1
!
j-
_w
Table 3-17 dramatically shows that 60 percent of all wol.kmanehip
FKs occurred during installation and/or assembly for both qualification and
acceptance tests. No "learning curve" improvements are apparent. Con-
centrated effort in this s_ngle area may have had a significant irnpact lot
both cost and schedule of the programs. Bad electrical connections (welds
and solder joints) accounted for a[rnoet 16 percent ol the acceptance work-
man ship problems.
Manufacturing process was the largest part FR problem; 43.8 per-
cent for qual_llcation and 30.7 percent for acceptance (possibly higher
because of the unknowns 39.9 percent). Part internal contamination was
also important (17. Z percent of part FRs) for acceptance. In general, the
process problem was significant throughout all three programs.
The summary of design FRs by cause is shown in Table 3-19. Five
different types of problems were almost equally important to the qualifica-
tion program. Circuit des4gn and mechanical installation were followed by
manufacturing process errors and innate physical property problems, and
then specificati.n errors. Four of these five were still important during
the acceptance test program with innate physical property problems
becoming dominant. The qualification program appears to have been only
marginally effective in screening these physical property problems, along
with manufacturing process errors, circuit design errors, and specification
errors (in order of importance to the acceptance program).
1
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TABLE 3-17. WORKMANSHIP PRIMARY FAILURE REPORT DEFECT TYPES
Workmanship FR
Defect Type
Test error
Paper er¢or
Bad electrical connection
Acciclentiat handting
Misu_
Wrong part used
Damaged wl res/coex
Contamination
Bed ali!]nment
Installation/assembly
Total
Qualification (35.2 percent)
Percent of
Ousntity Total
I 2.3
5 11.4
I 2,3
1 2.3
1 2.3
0 0
2 4.5
5 I1.4
2 4.5
26 59.1
44
Acceptance (51.4 percent)
Percent of
Cluantity Total
15 3.6
19 4.5
86 15.7
0 0
I 0.2
16 3.8
2 0.5
26 6.2
21 5.0
255 60.6
421
Nots: UsuaBy. accldental ha_dt_n9 and damaged wires/coax we:e I&T induo=d, not
"workmanship."
$-Z9
_d
The prirnary and I&T acceptance F_ data at both unit and systems
levels for all programs was classified by type and subsystem to study the
variances between subsystems. These data are presented in Table 3-20.
Generally, 40 percent of all FKs were workmanship, Z2. 5 percent part,
13.0 percent design, and significantly, Z2.5 percent were i&T induced. By
subsystem, both power and propulsion had high numbers of I&T type FRs when
compared to the other subsystems (36 and 47.4 percent, respectively). The
propulsion subsystem had a very low (5.3 percent) proportion of part
problems (no electronics), and the power subsystem had very few design
(4 percent) proble_,'ns. The telemetry and command (T&C) digital subsystems,
and the attitude control subsystems, as expected because era high con-
centration of electronics, had the highest concentration of part problems --
33.6 and 34. Z percent, respectively.
TABLE 3.18. PARTS PRIMARY FAILURE REPORT DEFECT TYPES
Qualification (12.8 Percent) Acceptance (29.1 Percent)
Part F R Percent of Percent o1
Defect Type Quantity Total Quantity Total
Workmanship 3 18.8 16 6.7
Contamination 3 18.8 41 17.2
Mfg. process 7 43.8 73 30.7
Design 3 18.8 13 5.5
Unknown 0 0 95 39.9
Total 16 - 238 -
TABLE 3-19. DESIGN PRIMARv FAILURE REPORT DEFECTTYPES
Qualification , Acceptance (16 7 Percent)
Quantity
Design FR
Defect Type
Wrong part
EMI
Physical properties
Specification error
Processerror
Circuit design
Mechanical if_stallation
Analytical error
-- Total
0
O
11
8
11
16
16
0
62
49.6 Percent)
Percent of
Total
0
0
17,7
12.9
17.7
25.8
25,8
0
- 137
Percent of
Quantity Total
I 0.7
1 0.7
4B 35.0
20 14,6
31 22.6
24 17.5
10 7.3
2 1.5
iI
I
I
!
!
1
Subsystem
COmmurtications
T&C RF
TABLE 3.20. PRIMARY AND I&T ACCEPTANCE FAILURE REPORT DATA
BY TYPE AND SUBSYSTEM
Failure Report Type
UNKNOWN
16(4,01
2{1.5)
Workmanshi
183140.3)
50137.9]
Parl
97(24)
24(1_.2)
Design t I&T45(11,11 63(20.5)
36(27.3] J 20(15.2)
Totals
404(38,2)
132(12.5)
T&C digital 2(I.3)
Attitude control 2(1.8)
Power 0(O
Propulsion 1(1.3)
AntennB 0(6)
Spacecraft
harlle_ 0(8)
Structural and
mechanical
All others
Total
NOTES: I)
61140.1) 51(33.6) 11(7.2)
39{35.1) 38(3¢2) 12(10,8}
28{37.3) 17(22.7) 3(4.0)
27(35.5) 4(5.3) 8(10.51
17{43.6) 3(7.7) 13(33.3)
28(58.3) 3(8,2) 5(10.4)
27(17.8) 152(144)
20(18.0) 111(10,5)
27(36.0) 75(7.1)
36(47.4) 78(7.2)
6(15.4) 39(3.7)
12125,0) 48(4.5)
0(6) 6(42.9) 0(6) 3(21.4) 5(35.7) 14{1.3)
0(8) 2(33.3} 1(16.7_ 1(16.7) 2(33.3) 6(0,6}
Unil and s eslems levi FR$ from 811 programs
( ) _%oftotal
Apl_raximgte
AIIocat=on
el All Units -o[o
49A
11 .O
(Combinedl
3,6
7.0
13.9
3.6
113
(Combined)
0.2
100
The spacecraft harness subsystem was segregated from the structural
subsystem because of the high number of FRs generated at the systems level.
Of the ll0 primary FRs of Program I at the systems level, 33 were wire
harness {30 percent), and el 38 I_T _'l_s, 7 (18 percent) were, against the
harness. The harness group was less significant on Programs g and 3.
where only two (6.4 percent) primary and two I&-T (14 percent) FRs were
reported. The total number of FRs per subsystem can be normalized, based
upon number of units. As shown in Table 3-2, a weighted calculation
indicates that approximately B0 percent of all hardware from which FRs
could have been produced wcrc from the communications subsystem. There-
fore, 38.2 percent of all programs primary and I&T FRs from the _'om-
municatLons subsystem sho.vs a better than average performance. Poor
perfo._mers inC[llde the attitude control, 10. 5 versus 3.6 percent; Tg.C
(both) 27.7 versus I1 percent. Other "good*' performers inct_de propulsion,
7.2 versus 13.9 pcr¢:t'nL, and _trttcturc_, 5. 8 vur_u_ 11. 3 pcrc_.nt.
!
1
3. 5 ORBIT FR ANA LYSLS
All of the reported orbital problems have been coded and classified
in a manner similar to that used for the primary FR data base at trait and
systems levels. The data has been divicled_inte_-basic gt'oops: 1) unique
problems (those which occurred only once on a program or arc the first
occtlrrence of several of similar problems on the same and/or suhsc(luent
(time) spacecraft); and 2) duplicate problems (prcviousL_r reported symptoms
with the same determined cause but not necessarily on the same serial
nt_mbel"ed spacecraft). A third group called operator error has b(,Pn artdt_d
to cover a single problem on Program I wherein a gl"emnd c:(mtz'oltcr caused
a major (. _tagc of payload communicati(ms through the use (.f impl'op(_r
_,-_1
precedures. These greupings are summarized on Table 3-21 for the two
programs (Pregrams 2 and 3 are combined). The percentage data shows
the similarity between the programs. Approximately 50 percent of all
problems are duplicates. 'ilais would imply generic defects which cause
repeated occurrences of the sa'_e problem on several spacecraft within a
program. The problems either did net occur or ware not identified in time
to enable the correction ef subsequent spacecraft prior to launch.
Of the unique problems, 52 percent were determined to be design
defects. This implies that the test program was relatively ineffective in
screening design defects. In fact, the vast majority of the design problems
were not tested for during the acceptance test program. These problems
involved life, static charge/dlscharge, orbital alignments, and zero gravity
conditions, deficiencies for which the test program was not designed to detect.
Therefore, the problem is one of overall test program design. It should also
be noted that the data of Table 3-21 reflects almost 44 orbit years of exper-
ience on the 12 spacecraft in orbit (see Table 3-1).
The criticality of any residual problem is an important criteria in
evaluating the effectiveness efa test program. This was evaluated as a
function of this effect and is presented in Table 3-22. Anomalies, periodic/
intermlttance, and hard failures occurred with the same frequency. All of
the catastrophic problems (i.e., loss of spacecraft er payload function ef
the spacecraft) occurred on Program l and were associated with a single
type of unit. This was a life/deslgn problem which occurred on a particular
lot of units which were all launched prior to detection. Many of the orbit
problems were not critical (36 percent), (e.g., loss of a single telemetry
channel). Others were operationally overcome by special ground station
command scqucncing (ll percent). The remaining problems (39 percent}
were mission degrading in that some critical function (payload} was lost,
impaired, or interrupted.
fABLE 3-21. ORBIT FAILURE REPORTS FOR ALL PROGRAMS
Type
J--on,L ob,em 
gw:;2°2:sbip
Pa=t
Design
Duplicates of above
Operator error
Total
L __._
"[attrt:(_lltiRJl! _ho_ll I[)
Program
1 2&3
1{1.5)" 1(4.5)
2t2.9) t{4.5)
13(t9.1) 4118.2)
18(26.5) 5(22.7)
33(48.5) 11 (50.0]
1{1.5] 0
68 22
Total
2(2.21
3{3.3i
] ?I18.9}
23(25.6)
44{489)
1(1.1)
9O
)arollthPses; tilt, data |hlV_ not I)(!t!l_ tlornl;tJl/(_(I
_._"
1
I
I
i
I
J_
TABLE 3-22. ORBI'I FA/LURE REPORTS SYMPTOM VERSUSSEVER_Ty
_--_ FOR ALL PROGRAMS
Unique Prob eros i D "I
, -- uP J,cate P,obtems !
Severity r Anorn-,., I , =_'l'i°_- ic Hard ppriP.q" "_=;_-* J
-- " "_'_¥ l_[ermlttei_t :i --,v_ lc Marc[
-_ ___r_ I Fe,, Anomaly -. I r , I
Noto,itic.i | 10 / I ........... ''e'_-e_l Pa,_ Total
O.r=looa,y; / B ] Z ,o . f , oo j
Ove[ cOIrT_ I '_¢ :M.oo I | , r / : !
_eg,_i._ ' o ! f o I lo I
• = 6 11 • i
Cata=trophic I_--_-_L_[ /2 * 5 5 ]1 !3 " i 35 i
Total ' t_ I ----_- -- _-__ =_ _ 0 ' t2 I
• .OAI same unit on Program 1 .... ----- J ...... ] = [
perator error on Program 1 not included t
II
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
4. TEST EFFECTIVENESS
4. 1 INTRODUCTION
FtJr thi.s _t_(ly, tt.sL eff_.ct[v4,ness has been R_,nerall_. ell'fined as tilt.
IILIIllbt'F Of fa_lt/r_, l't,pol-l_ (Fgs) g_,llol'at_.d ill a _iv_,n test oocrt,_,n 1o tile nut_-
her el firs (i.e. a dejects) which were available to bc _crt.encd. The anal),-
sis was approaclled fr_)ln two perspectives. First, "Si)_.t _.f[c 'h._t
Effectiveness" was calculated to as_¢.s_ the effectLveness of a partit-ular test
in detecting d_.fccts peculiar to that environment {e,g., lh0 _'ffecttw.ness o_
unit v[brati,_n tests in screenin_ the total FI_. group which was generated
during unit, system, and launch vibration, Second, a "(_eneral Teat l'-'f(ec-
tiveness" was ealcu|ated to acsess the effectivenes_ ()f a given test-relative
to the total I-'1_. population with_ut regard tt_ screening eligibility ti.e., all
remaining Fits were considered availab|e tt_ tlle ne×t lest onvir.nmt.ntL
Using both c_f these approaches, emnpari_ona were made between the individ-
ual unit anti systems level tests. A mathodoh)gy is outlined to vary tilt:
etmtent ,.f tilt, t_tal test program in i'espt_nse to the observed l;'lt rates.
4.2 DATA BASE
"I'llt. primary I,'Rs lot tt. st and in-orbit from t_rogra,ns 1 tilr¢_ug.i_
wt, rt, _.valuat_.d all(l classified [11 terms of tilt. tt.st_ ¢)r par'tit _llar ,.nv[l'Onlll(.lat
whvrt- tht. ['_R_ originate(I. "I't.._t data W_.l't. tak_.n fr(ml tilt, sunlnlar[(.._ of
aecti.n ',. _ and [n-orl)it data were takt.n from soetit)_ _. 5. l,',,r thi_ analysis.
tilt, <ltmlifi_ allen _111¢J dttt,[llanct, tt,zt data wt, r¢, rt.gr_mpt,d ill lilt. ful[owi_lg
¢ att,gt_ ri_,s:
t ",lit T_-st._
Initial ambient
_)'_tt'Ii_._ l,t,vt.l "l't'_t_
I3CTV/ESTV and initial IS F
Vih ration \'ibrati(>n and S|r[ '
The. rllml vat ttktlh/
temllt, raturt, t ycling
rilt'l'l_Idl Vat IAL|III
["[na 1 a I]lbit.]lt I,'inal IS'I-
All unit tc_ts I ,aIlllC]l ¢_])1' l';It i (lllh
.'\ll _yst.,m l_,,_l'-;
| ,,
f
i
TABLE4-1, PROGRAM 1 IN-ORBITPROSLEM SUMMARY
I
Prsblem I Number of
I Classification Different Problems[Vibration 1
Thermal vacuum 20
Not tested for I
during system [test 14Totals 35
Number of
Repetitive Problems
8
25
33
Total
1
28
39
68
The in-orbit data were similarly divided into three categories:
l) vibration related (launch), 2) thermal vacuumj and 3) all problems
(totals). The nature of the in-orbit data suggested further categorization. As
shown in section 3.5, many of the in-orbit problems were duplications of gen-
eric deficiencies. In addition, a significant number of the in-orbit problems
could not have been screened by the systems level acceptance test program as
defined. ,_ summary of the in-orbit problem data for Program 1 is presented
in Table 4-1. The criticality _f the in-orblt FRs is also ofinterest for analy-
sis andj therefore, additional sorts were defined as follows: l) catastrophic
degradation in performance of the cornmunicatians payload, 2) unique prob-
lems, and 3) significant degradation of any spacecraft performance parameter.
The total test effectiveness data base for the Specific Test Effectiveness
evaluation is presented in Table 4-Z. It includes, from all three programs=
qualification and acceptance test and in-orbit data on vibration, thermal
vacuum/thermal cycling, all tests, and the special categori,,s of in-orbit
probleJTns defined above.
4. 3 SPECIFIC TEST EFFECTIVENESS
The equations which define each "Specific Test Effectiv(,m, ss" calcu-
lation are sumtrmrized in Table 4-3. The results, using the data base of
Table 4-2, are presented in Table 4--4.
4._.1 Qualification Tests
Tht' test effectiveness calculations for qualification lests ave lil_fitt,d
tc_ the unit level because the total FR population i,_ assunl_.¢l to be tbo_e Fits
set,tally generated in the combined unit and systems level test p;'o_ranas. With
reference to Tabh, 4-4, Program 1 unit qualification tt, sts (all t,'sts) we.'¢,
significantly less t!ffective than PrograrllS Z and 3 (3t) versus 73 pl. rcent}.
This is probably due to the increased complexkty of IJr:_gram 1, which
rcsultt, dtn a grt, ater _lul_aber of relatively subtle design and interface prob-
lems. The learning curve relative to test technique is also a likely- signifi-
cant factor, In any e'.cnt, for a new conaplex spacer-raft, ttlt. data suggt'_ts
that systems lvvel tests will probably be sttbstantially inoFe important than tixo
unit tev,'l. F,'om 'Fabh, 4-Z_ the Program 1 s_,stenls D.vel qualifitatton test
program screened more problems than unit i(._,,.l t¢,sts }_, a factor of I. }:
(¢_0 w, rsus 33 FRs). Foe tht" t:olllbine¢l programs, systems h'v_'l tests ar,,
more important by a factor of 1.2.
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rTABLE 4-3. TEST EFFECTIVENESS EQUATIONS
Test
Vibration
"nlermal vlcuum/thermel cycling
AIItests
• Totes communications
lOSS
• Unique probtems
• Performance degradation
(_1 subsystems)
Test
Unit ambient
Unit vibration and SPT
Unit thermal vacuum/
temp_roture cycling
SPECIFIC TEST EFFECTIVENESS =
Equation
TE 1
Total vib£ation FRs (unit or _ystems test)
All subseauent vibration F Rs
Isyltems test and in-orbit + Total vibrlLtion FRs (unit or wsterns test|
or only in-Orbit)
Totet thermal vacuum/thermal cyclin_ FR= (unit or systems test)
TE2 = AJl sublequent thermal vacuum] Total thermal vacuum/thermal cycling
thermal cycling (syltem$ test and +
in-orbit or only in-orbit) FRs (unit or systeins test)
All FRs (unit of systems test)
TE3 " All s_bsequent FRt (systems test t All FR$ (unit or systems test)
• nd in-orbit or onty in-orblt)
All FRs (systems tat)
==
TE4 All subsequent in.orbit • All FRI (systems test)
FRs
TE E
All FRs (systlmn= test)
=
Number of operational problems ÷ All FRs (systems test)
reyeale(_
TE 6
All FRs (systems test)
Number of failures which degraded ÷ All FRs (systems test)
pgrfo_mllnCe or mission
GENERAL TEST EFFECTIVENESS*
Equation
Total initial ambient unit FRs
TE? = Atl |uDsequent FRs (unit test, ÷ Total inltiel ambient unit FRs
systems test, end in-orbit)
Total vibration and post vibration performalrlce test FRs
TEE _ All sub|eq_ent FRS (unit test, Total unit vit]ratlon and po_t vibration
systems test, and in.orbit) + performance test FRs
Total unit thereat vacuum/thermal cycling FRs
TE9 = All sub=equant FRs (unit test, Total unit thermal v_cuum/thermat
systems test and in.orbit) + cycling FRs
*The qualification test effectivenQss equ3tion: do not include in.orbit failures
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Table 4-3 (continued)
Teat
Unit final ambient
SystemJ test initial ambient
DCTVIESTV and first IST
Systems test vibration and SPT
Systems test thermat vacuum
Systems test final IST and Cape
Test
Unit initial ambient
Unit vibration and SPT
Unit thermal va¢uum/
temperature ¢yebng
Unit final ambient
Systems initial ambient and
DCTV/ESTV and IST (firsl)
Equation
TEl0 =
Total final unit ambient FRs
All subsequent f'FLs {systems test + Total final unit ambient FRS
and in.0rbit
Total initial ambient, DCTV/ESTV and first IST FRs
I-E11 = All sub_quant FRs (systems Total initial ambient and DCTV/ESTV
test and in.orbit) + and firsL IST FRs
Total systems test vibration and SPT FRs
TEl2 = All subsequent FRa (wstems + Total systems test vibration and gPT FRs
test and in-orbit(
Total systems test thermal vacuum FRs
TEl3 = All subsequent FR$ (systems + Total systems test thermal vacuum FRs
test and in-orbit)
All systems test final IST and Cape FRs
TEl4 = All subsequent + Air ¢ystemr test final IST and Cape F_s
m-orbit FRs
DESIGN TEST EFFECTIVENESS
Equation
Total initial ambient unit design problems
TE 15 " AlL design problems in unit, systems test, and in.orbit
Total vibration and post vibration unit d@_ign problems
TE|6 = All design problem| in subsequent _ Total unit vibration and post vibration
tests and in-orbit qesign ploblems
Total unit t_ermal vacuum/thermal cycling design problems
TE t 7 = All design prc_blerns in subsequent Total unit thermal vacuum/thermal
tests 6nd in-orbit + cycling design problems
Total final unit ambient dlsign problems
TEl8 = All design problems in subsequent
teltl and in-orbit
+ Total final unit ambient design
problems
TEI9 =
Total initial am_3=. "TV/ESTV and first IST design problems
Design problems in subsequent + Total initial ambient, DCTVIESTV _ncl first
tests and m-orbit IST d0sign problems
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Table 4-3 (continued)
Test
Systems Iest vibrstion
end SPT
_ystern5 t_( thermal vat,lure
Systems test final IST end
Cape
TE2D =
TE21 =
P'qoatiott
Total Wstems test vibration end SPT design problems
All design problems in subsequent + Total syltems test vibration and
lest| lind in-0rbit SPT design problems
Total systems test thermal vacuum delign droblems
All d¢|ign problems in subsequant tests + TOtBI systams _|t thllrmal vacuum
and in-orbit design problems
TE22 =
All |ystems test final IST and Cape design problems
All delign problems
in.orbit ÷ All systems test tinal IST and Cape design problems
TABLE 4-4. SPECIFIC TEST EFFECTIVENESS ESTIMATES (PERCENT)
Unit Test Effectiveness System T_st Effectiveness All Tern
Program
Te,_t= 1
AcGept
Vibration 96
Thermal vBcuum/
tamDeratura
cycling 69
All tests 76 36
• Total corilmuni-
¢atioNs low
• Unique problems
• Performance dBgra-
darien (all
subwstems)
All data
Items teSlad
for
"Ba_ed on totJI FRt for the test program
2 and 3
Qual" Accept Quat +
22 77 44
39 76 75
72 72
1,2and3
Accept Qual"
93 27
70 47
7G 45
Program
1,2
1 2 and 3 and 3
Accept Accept Accept
67 100 83
30 75 38
56 55 55
99 tOO 99
71 71 71
68 79 70
77 84 79
Programs
1, 2.and3
Accept
9'3
81
9O
1
i
For qualification vibration tests, the systems level screen on Pro-
gram 1 was more important by a factor of 3.6 (25 versus 7 FRs)j and Z.? for
the combined programs. For the combined programs, a total of 33 percent
of all qualification FRs (unit and systems level) were generated in a vibra-
tion test environment, This relatively large fraction {vibration tests are
only IZ percent of the total acceptance test FR group) is partly because many
structural elements are tested for the first tlme at systems Icvcl.
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For qualification thermal tests, the systems level screen on Pro-
gram I was more important by a factor of 1.6, and 1.1 for the combined
programs. For the combined programs, a total of 14 percent of all qualifi-
cation FRs were generated in a thermal test environment (thermal tests are
19 percent o_ the total acceptance test FR group).
The effectiveness of the qualification test screen relative to teslgn
problems is discussed in Section 4.5.
4.3.Z Acceptance Tests
The Specific Test Effectiveness calculations for acceptance tests are
based on the entire FR history for the flight spacecraft, including in-orbit
performance to date. The F-6 spacecraft for both programs was excluded
from this data base because no in-orblt data exists (the booster failed for F-6
spacecraft on Program 1; and the F-6 spacecraft of Program 3 has not been
launched.) The effectiveness of the acceptance test screens was relatively
consistent across the programs with a combined program test effectiveness
of 75 percent for unit tests, 56 percent for systems tests, and ,_9 percent for
the entire test program.
The vibration acceptance test screen was highly effective at 93 percent
for unit tests, 83 percent for systems tests, and 99 percent for the entire
test program. Only one vibration problem occurred for 12 spacecraft launches.
A total of onl_, 12 percent of the acceptance test FRe occurred in a vibration
test. The data strongly suggests that a three-axis vibration test at spacecraft
level is probably not required. For all systems level vibration tests (includ-
ing F-6 spacecraft), a total of only six FRs were generated, with five occur-
ring in the post-vibratlon performance test (SPT) and one occurring during the
initial vibration test which is along the Z-axls (see Table 3-1Z). The risk
associated with limiting systems level acceptance vibration testing to a single
axis is probably negllglble.
The thermal acceptance test screens were 70 percent effective at the
unit level, but only 38 percent effective at systems level. The combined test
programs were 81 percent effective. With reference to the Program l in-orbit
FR summary in Table 4-I, note that 28 (41 percent) in-orblt problems
occurred which could have been detected in either unit or systems level
thermal testing. These problems included telemetry instrumentation errors,
circuit design deficiencies, noisy earth sensor bolcmeters, and RF anomalies.
However, a total of 39 (57 percent) of the in-orblt problems could not have
been screened by the test program because of test technique deficiencies.
These included static discharge pz'oblenls, early wearout of life limited itch]s,
thermal deformation of structures, ground station operator errors, and zero-
gravity effects. Generally, the deficiencies in test technique resulted from
either the omission of tests such as static discharge or TWT Life tests, or
failure to test units in this entire operating mode. Theref,_re, the relatively
low effectiveness of the systems level thermal vacuum environment is prob-
ably a result of test technique deficiencies _ nd not total test time in that
environment. The limited effectiveness of increased test time in the therma_
vacuum environment is presented in more detail in section 6 ¢_f this report.
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Relative to problems which are critical to the coIT_munications satel-
lite mission, the systenz acceptance test screens were highly e{fective at
99 percent for the eornblned programs (see Table 4-4). The single catastro-
phic problem occurred on the initial spacecraft of Program I and _vas the
result of an early wearout mechanism which could not have been screened b 7
the acceptance test program as designed. P_ograms Z and 3 have experienced
no failures whleh could constitute catastrophic degradation.
The effectiveness of the systems test screens relative to FRs with
some in-orblt performance implication was 70 percent for the combined pro-
grams (see Tahte 4-4), using all rRs. I/ the FRs which could not have been
screened are excluded, the systems test effectiveness increased to 79 percent
Lot performance related _ailuree.
4.4 GENERAL TEST EFFECTIVENESS
The equations which define each "General Test Effectiveness" calcu-
lation are also summarized in Table 4-3. The results, using the data base
of Table 4-5 are presented in Tables 4-6 and 4-7. Figure 4-I shows the
relative test effectiveness of unit and systems level tests and the first year
in orbit,
Tests
TABLE 4-E, GENERAL TEST EFFECTIVENESS DATA SASE
Unit
Ambient (initial) ° ° °
Vibration and SPT
Thermal _ecuum/ternperetuce cycling
Ambient (final)
Systems
initial ambient, DCTV/[:STV, and
IST (initial)
Vibration and SPT
Thermal vacuum
IST (final) and Cap_ (acceDtance only)
In-orblt problems - 10 'fear projection"
Qualification
Tss_s
19
7
5
1
27
25
7
1
Number of F Rs
14
4
3
2
3
S
n
1
304
8g
gg
10
65
3
g
33
91
A ceaptanee Tests
Pro_fam
2and3 "°
102
10
31
2
17
3
2
7
64
"The total failure estimates are based on the p_icted 10'year failure rate for indlvidual spac_¢zaft.
When failure rata turv_.5 were not available, the failure rats was estimated by considering the re(ative
nurnt:_t of in.orbit failures e_¢l 1he predicted failure rates for spacecraft which we, e Ilunched in the
same p_ried.
• "The shell isexcluded
• " "Performance tests not identified as to time st occurrence have been included herein.
NOTE: RCS te_t_have not be,anincluded,
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TABLE 4-6. GENERAL TEST EFFECTIVENESS OF QUALIFICATION AND ACCEPTANCE TESTS
.
J
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Tests
Unit
Ambient (initial]
Vibration
Thermal vacuum/cycling temperature
Ambient (final(
Combined unit tests
Systems
Ambient, DCTV/ESTV, and
IST (initial)
Vibration and SPT
Thermal vacuum
IST (final) and Cape (acceptance only)
Combined systems tests
Combined unit and system_ tests
Test Effectiveness. Percent
Qualification
Tests
Program
21
I1
S
2
35
w
Acosptanc_ Tests"
Program
2 I
44 43
22 22
21 32
18 5
72 71
- 32
- 2
- 7
- 27
- 55
- 87
2and3
General un t arab ant accep ance es effec ve _ess was calcula ed w= h the fo owing equa ion:
TE 7 = 304/703 - 0.43 (43 percent). All other acceptance test ef fectiveneszes were calculated in Ihe
_me way.
43
7
25
2
61
18
4
3
10
31
73
TABLE 4-7. SUMMARY
Tests
Unit
Initi=l ambient
Vibration
Thermal
Final ambient
Unit Total
Systeml
DCTV
Initial IST
Vibration and SPT
"r_errnal v=©uum
Final IST and Cape
Systemstotal
All tests total
Orbit (1 year estimate)
Orbit total (10years)
Grand total
(14 spacecraft)
Number
FRs
406
99
131
I1
847
11
71
6
11
41
140
787
112
155
OF ACCEPTANCE TEST SCREENING EFFECTIVENESS
FOR COMBINED PROGRAMS
Tmst
Effectiveness,
Percent
43
18.5
29.9
3.6
68.7
3.7
25
2.8
5.3
20.9
47.5
63.5
72.3
100
Percent of
Test FRs
51.6
12.6
16.0
1.4
82.2
1.4
g.0
0,8
1,4
52
17,0
100
Remaining
of Defect
Population
942
536
437
306
942
295
284
213
207
195
295
942
155
155
942
Percent of
Systems
Test FRs
7.9
50.7
4.3
7.9
29.3
100
4-9
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I
SO
80
?0
6O
EO
Z
w
L
4O
30
2O
10
COMBINED TESTS I
83.E_ EFFECTIVE' ILI I
72.3%
43%
29.9_.
25%
20.9_
t8.E%
5.3%
UNIT UNIT UNIT UNIT BYBTEM.'; SYSTEMS S'fETEM$ _;YEr_MS SYSTEMS IN ORBIT
INITIAL VIBRATION THERMAL FINAL DCTN/EETV INITIAL, VIBRATION TV FINAL IS]" (1 _EARI
AMBIENT AMBIENT IBT AND SPT ANO CAPE
FIGURE 4.1. ACCEPTANCE TEST SCREENING E FF ECTIVENESE FOR COMBINED PROGRAMS
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4.4. I Qualification Tests
The test effectiveness calculations for qualification tests are limited
to the unit level because the total FB. population is assumed to be those FRs
actually generated in the combined unit and systems level test program.
With reference to Table 4-6, the Program Z combined unit qualification tests
were significantly more effective than Program 1 (7Z versus 35 percent).
This probably is a result of the higher complexity of Program 1 which
resulted in a greater number of subtle design and interface problems com-
bined with the learning curve relative to test technique. The Program 2 sys-
tems level prototype spacecraft tests benefitted from the Program 1 test
experience. However. for a new complex spacecraft, the data suggests that
systems level prototype spacecraft tests will probably be substantially more
important than the unit tests by almost a factor of two (60 versus 3Z FRs).
The unit ambient test screen was the single most effective unit test
in both programs (gl percent for Program 1 and 44 percent for Program Z).
The unit qualification vibration test was the second most effective unit test
and was 11 percent effective in Program 1 and 22 percent effective in Pro-
gram g. The thermal vacuum test was more effective for Program 2 (Zl per-
cent) than for Program 1 (8 percent). The final ambient test was only
2 percent effective in Program 1, whereas it was 1 8 percent effective in
Program Z.
4.4. Z Acceptance Tests
The general test effectiveness ea]culations for acceptance tests arc
based on the entire FR history for the flight spacecraft, including the pre-
dicted in-orbit performance for I0 years. The ground test FRs include the
F-6 spacecraft data. A predicted I0 year failure estimate has been included
in the in-orbit failure estimate to correct for the loss of the i?-6 spacecraft.
Table 4-5 describes this calculation procedure. The Programs 2 and 3 in-
orbit total failure estimate has been similarly corrected to include a predic-
tion of the yet unlaunched F-6 spacecraft in-orblt failures. The effectiveness
of the acceptance test screens was relatively consistent across the progran_s
with a test effectiveness for units of 71 percent in Pro,c;ram i and ¢_I percent
in Programs Z and 3; 55 and 51 percent, respectively, for syste*ns level
tests, and 87 percent for Progran% I and 73 percent for Progran_s 2 and 3 ....................:'
for the entire test program.
The Progranls I through 3 unit initial ambient tests were the mosl
effective tests (43 percent) performed at the unit level (see Figure 4-I). The
unit thermal tests were the second most effective tcsts with 29.9 percent
(3Z percent Program 1 and Z5 percent Programs Z and 3). The data in(ii_atc
that these tests provide the best opportunity for defect detection and
correction.
The systems level ambient. DCTV/ESTV, and initial IST pr,,vide the
next most effective defect detection t¢'st. The test was 32 percent vf/vviive
on Program 1 and 18 percent effective on Programs Z and 3, with Z8 percul]t
overall.
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The s_,stems level final IST and cape tests were 20.9 9ercent effective
(Z? percent on Program 1 and 10 p_rceneon Programs Z and 3). The unit
vibration test was Z2 percent effective in Program 1 and only 7 percent effec-
tive in Programs Z and 3, The combined test effectiveness of the unit final
ambient, systems level vibration, and systems thermal vacuum tests
ranged between _.8 to 5.3 percent. The data i.ndicate that these tests are not
very effective in scree_aing defects and failures. They suggest that reduced
vibration and thermal vacuum testing at the spacer raft acceptance level could
be implemented without a significant effect on the fraction defective in a
delivered spacer rafL
4.5 TEST EFFECTIVENESS FOR DESIGN PROBLEMS
The equations which define each '_Design Test Effectiveness '' calcula-
tion are also summarized in Table 4-3. The results, using the data base of
Table 4-8_ are shown in Table 4-9.
4.5. I Qualification Testa
The test effectiveness calculations for the _billty of the qualification_
tests to identif_r design deficiencies are based on the FR history for all
spacecraft {prototype and flight), and includes in-orbit perforrnancelo
date. Only_de_ign problems have bees included. The design test effectiveness
for the Program 1 qualification test program was 32 percent and for Pro-
gram 2 it was oni_r 23 percent. The data indicate that the tests were only
partially successful in detecting deelgn deficiencies.
The Program 1 unit qua[ificatlon tests were only 6 percent effective
in detecting design problems. Program Z was 14 percent effective_ The
Program 1 combined systems ]evel tests were 27 percent effective as con-
trasted with Frogram Z, which was only 11 percent effective. The Prt_gram 1
systems level vibration test had the highest test effectiveness, with 16 per-
cent, and was the single most important qualification test for the idet_tifics-
_ion of design deficiencies.
The above data show that unit and systems level qualification tests
wel'e marginally effective in detecting design problems. Overall, only 47 ,)ut
of L48 clesi_n problems were detected in the aloft and systenas level test
"q'_li'ft'_'t'i0n program of Program 1, On Program 2, 15 out _,t" 66 were
detected. This suggests that insufficient quali[ieatlon testing was perfornaed
_>n both programs, in the future, more extensive testing, in terms t_f envi-
l'onnaez_tai and t_pcrationa[ extremes, sh_uldhe perforn_ed. Possibly, the
duratiun _,f the qualification tests shot*[d be extended ill an attempt 1¢, sc_'t, en
out additional desig_ deficiencies and avoid delays to the acceptance test
pl'ograms .'hie to design problems.
4-}d
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TABLE 4.8. PROGRAMS 1 TH ROUGH 3 DESIGN PROBLEMS SUMMARY BY TEST PHASE
Spacecraft
Unit Teit Systems Test
Ihitial
Ambient*" Vibration TV/TC
Initial
Ambient
Final IST and Vibration Final
Ambient DCTV/ESTV and SPT TV IST
Orbit
Launch Unique
Operations Problems
| F.? 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O
J F-8 2 0 t 0 O O 0 0 1 0
unatsigned 3 0 0 0 0 0 O O 0 0
;.._ ' | Subtotal 46 5 27 2 21 21 6 t t 18
Programs2 and 3 .:
| Q_al 5 I 2 1 3 3 0 O - -
F-t 7 t 1 0 0 0 1 1 O 2
F-2 2 1 1 0 1 O 0 0 0 3 ,
F-3 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 O O O
1 0 0 0 O O 0
F-4 4 I 4
F-5 S 1 I 0 0 0 0 O O O
F-6 2 0 I 0 0 0 0 O - •
l Shelf 1 * 0 0 0 ........
Unas=igned 3 0 0 (} 0 0 0 O O 0
S_btotals 33 5 10 2 6 3 1 1 0 5
I Totals 79 I0 3? 4 27 24 7 2 1 23
o The 9 FRs written against _ single capacitor have been considet_-_cl a single problem.
• *Tile unit FRs where [he _est phase unknown were included in the initial ambient unit test.ii '
4.5.2 Acceptance Tests J
Becattse of the relatively high numbers of design FRs _rf the early .
spacecraft, thc acceptance design test effectiveness calculations were basLd
I on the ability of the first three flight spacecraft of Programs l and 2 to
identify those design deficiencLcs which were undetected by the qttalifieation
programs. The combined unit and systems lave tcst _crc 4 percent effee-
I tive. Therefore, approximately 75 percent of all design deficlencios werefoLmd after the testing of the first four spacecraft (prot,)type and three flight).
!
I 4-1'1
Program 1
Oual 4 0 4 1 14 20 4 OF-t 6 3 7 0 3 0 0 1 0 0
F-2 9 0 S 1 3 0 1 O O 12
F-3 7 0 2 0 0 1 t 0 O 3
F-4 4 O 2 0 0 0 o 0 0 I
• F-5 5 0 ! 0 O 0 0 0 0 2
F-6 2 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 O O
TABLE 4-9. GENERAL TEST EFFECTIVENESS FOR DESIGN PROBLEMS
Tests
Unit
Ambient
Vibration
Thermal vacuum/temperature cyelinb
Ambient
.. , Combined u?lit t_st ....
Syseems
Ambient, OCTV/ESTV, and IST {firstl
Vibration end SPT
Thermef vacuum
(ST (final)
Programt
3
0
3
1
6
10
16
4
O
27
32
Dssi_ Test Effectiveness, Percent
, ,, , , ,
Qualification Ace=prance
ProBrar _ t and 2:
F-l, F.2, and F-3
Program 2 SpaCecraft
8 22
2 4
3 17
2 I
14 3g
5 TO
6 1
0 4
0 3
11 16
=1 , = - , ._ i
23 49
Combined sys'lems_tt
i Combined unit end systems test
The unit tests wet'e more effective in detecting design deficiencies
th_n the sysLerns level tests (39 versus 16 percent), The single most effec-
tive test was Lhe unit ambient (ZZ percent). Unit the_m_l teats were 17 per-
cent effective and the systems level initial-ambient, DCTV/ES'['V, and initial
L_T were I0 percent e_fccti_e, The remaining tests were very ine(fective
(1 to 4 percent).
The first three flight spacecraft unit and system._ level acceptance
tests were surprisingly more effective in detecting design problems than wt, t'e
the individual unit and systems level qualification pr,,_.,'ams. The data renal
to suggest that an important factor in detecting design pl-_blenas is the amount
,ff til"ne spent in testing. What is important in detecting design deficiencies
appears to be the full e×ercislng _f t_r_it_ and the spacecraft in a _'arloty,,l"
envlrm_mental and operational conditions, The proper conclusion may be thai
an effect-ire qt_alification test program is one in which a spacecraft is fully
exercised in changing environments and operational modes (novel omditim_sl
until such tlme as the test data indicate that the time between the detection of
design problems {mean t_.me to _ailure) is sucil that it is not cc_st vffvcti_te to
continue thP testing.
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4.6 RELIABILITY PREDICTIONS USING A TEST EFFECTIVENESS MODEL
The concept of Test Effectiveness (TE)*" assumes the existence of a
fixed initial defect population which is steadily reduced by successive test
screens of consistent effectiveness {i.e. , the test screen effectiveness is
independent of the d_f-et population size; and all men_bers of the population
are eligible for the sc:'een). The test screens are not required to have equal
effectiveness. The TE model (Equation i) has the property that the total
defects screened by "n" environments are independent of the sequence of
environments.
Let:
T = total nun_ber of defects in the initial population
f
n
F N =
E =
n
nun]bcr of defects screened in environlTlent "o 'i
total defects screened by the cotnbination of "n'" environments
test effectiveness of environment "n"
then:
f
E =A n
n n-I
T- E f
n
n=l
or
I n-I fn )=E T_. 'fn n n" 1
(1) "
The TE model also }]as the property that the nun_ber of defec[s
screened in any particular environment (or group of envh'onments) will be
linearly related to the nun_ber of previously screened defects as follows:
Let:
E l =
E z =
T =
effectiveness of test g*'oup r
offoctiven¢,ss of test group Z
total initial defect population
fl = defects screened in test group 1
fg = defects screened in test group Z
'::A. F, Timmins, A Study of i_elationship bet%w, en Qerfortuanct! in Systt,lus
Tests and Space, " Proct,¢'dh_s of the Institute of Environt_vntal S¢ivncu_
197._, 1,17Z
4-1_
then
fl = EIT
-- = E2 -- flfz zz (T-fl " --
\ EX
fl
Therefore, a convenient check of the applicability of the TE model for
prediction purposes is _o evaluate the relatiot_ship between the in-orbit fail-
ure group for a fixed period (1 Fear was chosen) _nd the systems level test
group or the cornbined systems, and unit test groups, A linear relationship
would be expected. Sim.qarly, a linear relationship should exist between the
systems level test failure group and the unit test failure group.
These data are presented in Figure 4-Z. Data Set "A" illustrates the
relationship between in-orblt FRs and the combined tests FR group, Simi-
larly, "B" and "G" compare systems level test FRs with in-orbit and unit
level, respectively. The FR data is summarized in Table 4-10, The linear
relationships predicted by the TE model are apparent. The unit data indi-
cates a bias of approximately Z0 FRs which apparently have no reliability
significance, The F4 and F8 spacecraft appear unusual but may only be
indicative of the statistical variance. The defect analysis data presented
earlier in this report {see Figure 3-4) also indicated F4 and F8 were atypical.
A more detailed analysis of the data base is required.
As mentioned earlier in this report, the Fi spacecraft was retro-
flttcd to correct all known design problems and was _xpnsed to a complcte
retest ;at systems level prior to launch. Given the test histot'y of F-1
(105 F;;_s; see Table 4-10) and the estimated effectiveness of the t'rograll, 1
combined test environments (D. 87, see Table 4-0), a total of 8.0 failures
would have been predicted-.fcur._he retest program° In fact, a t_>talof 8 (lid
occur. This data is shown as FI R in Figure 4-Z. The in-orbit (I year)
screening effectiveness is greater than systems level test ('.).7Z versus 0. 5"_I
and, therefore, I1 failures would have been expected if FI had been launched
without the retest prograna. This is in good agreement with Figurt, 4-2,
In surntnary, the data indicates that a_TE model could by u_vd aa t}n,
basis for reliability predictions and, therefore, couhl I>t, used to adjust the
content of a test program as requh'ed to achieve an acceptable i',,_lfhla]
defect group. If the number of test failures were too high for a particular
spacecraft, the test program would be continued until acceptable b'll r_tt_,_ ar_.
achieved.- The F-I retest program is a case in point. Consistt,nt failure
reporting cri_erla would be required and statistical limits for the TE m,,dt, I
would have to bc deer,loped. The results of this stucl_" indic'at,, that such an
approach is feasible.
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TABLE4 10. SUMMARY OF PRIMARY FAILURE REPORTS FOR PROGRAM 1
(Unassigned FRs Excluded]
Program 1
Spacecraft
F-1
F-2
F-3
F-4
F-5
F-6
F-7
F-8
Total
Unit FRs
77
74
52
83
52
41
36
57
Total
Systems F Rs
28
19
15
6
10
15
8
10
Combined Total
Test F Rs
105
92
67
89
62
56
44
67
Systems Level
Retest FRs
B
in.0rbit*
FRs (1 year)
0
14
8.8
8.8
82
5.3
2
Totals 472 110 582 8 47.1
72.813.75 159
Average
per
spacecraft 6.7 ll
"The number of in.orbit FRs for the first year in orbit was estimated from the orbital Duane plots
in Figures 5-29 through 5 gB or 5 16 for the F.B spacecraf[.
•"Th_ _verBg_vlasbased on sev_iih_-orbitspacecraftsincethe F -6booster(ail_d.
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5. FAILURE RATES AS A FUNCTION OF TIME
The system level and in-orbit failure data was analyzed to assess
time dependent trends and relationships. In particular, the applicability of
the D_mne eeliability _rowth model was evaluated.
Each of the systems level and in-orbit primary failure reports (FlUs)
have been associated with their respective time of occurrence to establish the
required data base. The test time-to-failure was used for the systems level
FRs and was estimated from either the individual spacecraft test logs or
east reports, The time recorded was only an indication of the time-to-failure,
since spacecraft "off _'time during test reeonfiguration, third shift, weekends,
etc.. was not extracted, The in-orbit times were those reported bythe
customers at the time the event occurred. Byde£initlon, in-orbit time
is current to the date of this report (March 1, 1977). Because systems test
times varied from a low of 4752 test hours to a high of l Z, 288; and accu L.
mulated in-orbit time varies between 15,593 and 53, 173 hours on the different
spacecraft of the three programs, it is difficult to combine all data. There-
fore, analysis was basically made by individual spacecraIt, A sun_mary of
accumulated time for systems level test (launch), in-orbit to date (3-|-77),
and combined is provided in Table 5-I. _l'he total data base represents over
12 years oi systems level test experience and almost 44 in-orbit years.
Where sufficient data were available (e.g., three or more FRs), three
different graphs were prepared for each spacecraft as applicable. The
first, graph A, was a Duane plot of the systems level test data. Graph B,
the second, was a Duane plot of the in-orbit report data, using each launch
date as the initialization point. The third, graph C, is a combined systems
test and in-orbit plot, using the start of systems test as the initialization
point and assuming that the i,i-orbit data was contiguous to the end o[ systems
test !launch). it was not analyzed rigorously with the Duane model, but was
presented in the same format,
Scatter diagrams of the logl0 cornulatlve failure rate versus logl0 of
the cumulative time oZ earn event were plotted. A weighted linear regression
was used to fit least squares estimates for the appropriate Du_ne equatlc;ns.
The weighting scheme used for the linear regressions is to give the first
failure of each space.raft aweight of 1, the second failure a weight of 2, the
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ITABLE 5 1. SYSTEMS TEST, IN-ORBIT. AND COMBINED
ACCUMULATED TIMES (HOURS)
Spacecraft
Program 1
ProtoW_x_
F-1
F-2
F-3
F-4
F-5
F-6
F-7
F-8
Program 2
Prototype
F-I
F-2
F-3
Program 3
F-4
F-6
F-6
Totals
Systems Level
Test (Launch)
7,24S (_OT)"
12,288
5.184
6,692
4.752
6.552
6,700
5,s32
7,846
.3,536 (EOT)
6,384
6,864
8,808
5,832
5,328
5.O88 (EOT)
107,836
(12.3 years)
In-Orbit
to 3-1-77
N/A
15,593
53,173
45.882
44,784
41.347
N/A
30_35
19,973
N/A
37.766
33,813
15,943
25,228
20.936
N/A
384,913
(43.9 year=)
"All times in hour=; EOT = End of test
nth failure a weight of n, etc, ; thus, _iving the last event the most
All data is assumed £o _it the Duane _nalys_s mode[ of the form:
Combined
(If Appllceble)
NIA
27,581
58.357
51.144
49,516
4?.899
N/A
36.667
27,821
N/A
44.140
40,677
24351
31,090
26,264
N/A
466, [ 77
(53,2 years)
weight.
:_F
_: -_- :KT "e
_vhere:
X = cumulative failure rate
T = total time in hours
F : f_i_ure events d_rlu_ time T
E : constant determined by eireu_nstances
O" : _rowth rate (slope)
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J When plotted on on lOgl0 - log I0 paperj the model appears as astraight line of the form:
!
i
l°gl0
T
l°gl0
I
Therefore, equation (1) reduces to:
lOgl0k = lOgl0K - alOgl0T
and regression fitting will determine the constant K and slope a.
{z)
The failure rate at time t. is ki; this equates to instantaneous failurerate for any event as:
l /_idtk. = - = KT "°_ (3)
I where:
I F i = instantaneous fails per unit time at time ti
Therefore:
i F i -- K (i-_)ti -_ (4}
I Using the above expressionsj the Duane model can he interpreted for three
different conditions:
I lOgl0 _ . I/( 3 )
! / I \(1)l l°gl0
I
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For condition 1, ¢_= +l; theref,.re, F. = 0 and k. = K/T. This is a
limiting condition and a_÷l. 1 1
For condition Z, u= 0; therefore, F. = K and k. - K (i.e.. the failure
rate is a constant, not influenced by time.)t 1
For condition 3, a = -l; therefore, _i = ZKT and k. = KT. For this
case, the failure rate linearly increases with time. This _mplies either an
increasing test screen effectiveness or that the test article is degenerating
as a result of test (i. e. , the defect population is increasing with time}.
An understanding of these boundary conditions will assist in the eval-
uation of the Duane plot's.
Figures 5-1 through 6-15 contain the scatter diagrams for each
spacecraft on Programs I through 3 where sufficient data existed. Figures
A and B contain the weighted least squares Duane estimate curves. Fig.
ure C contains only visual estimations of the curve (or curves) to fit the
data, using straight lines. For this combined data no meaningful weighted
least squares Duane estimate could be found for most spacecraft because
of the marked contrasts in slope between early systems test and in-orbit
data. A time reference from Table 5-1 has been provided on each graph.
The operational timeo_o-date for B figures has been indicated but was not used
as a data point for purposes of determining Duane curves; only data points
corresponding to the occurrence of failure events were utilized in the Duane
analysis.
Table 5-2 contains the parameter estimates derived for each Duane
analysis shown in the figures. This tab_.s also contains the number of data
points utilized to derive each Duane curve estimate. It should be noted that
where two or more failure events occurred at the same point in time, the
total cumulative failure rate was calculated as one data point.
A reviewer the spacecraft Duane curves and Table 5-2 reveals that
systems level failure rates vary w_dely as a function of time. This is best
seen in Figures 5-18a and 5-19a, wherein all systems level Duane curves
have been redrawn on one figure for Program l and Programs 2 and 3,
respectively, The slopes shown appear to represent all three l)uane curve
bounding conditions described above. Early spacecraft trend toward nega-
tive slopes {-¢r) and later spacecraft approach the a= ÷l limit. The final
failure rate of systems level test {kfst) does tend to converge for all [light
spacecraft (especially on Program 1) and gets lower with each succeeding
spacecraft (fewer FRs per spacecraft, therefore, lower failure rate}.
When all of the in-orbit Duane curves are compared and plotted on
Figures 5-18b and 5-19b, it is shown that all slnpes are similar (positive o)
and form a family of curves, again with the property that successive space-
craft generally have lower failure rates at any given time in orbit. There
are three special cases for the in-orbit data. Both Program l Fol space-
craft and Program 2 F-3 spacecraft have had no orbital anomaly repc_rts in
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over 15,500 hours of operation, and, therefore, have rot been shown. The
F-5 spacecraft of Program 3 has not had an orbit problem in its last ll,000
hours of operation. The F-5 spacecraft also has the Duane curve with a
negative slope (-o). If one assumes a failure occurring on 1 March 1977 for
this spacecraft, a worst case estimation line could be drawn through the cal-
culated failure rate at 20,936 hours. As a failure has not in reality occurred,
the actual slope should he even more positive than that drawn on Figure 5-15b.
This estimator would appear to depict the F-5 spacecraft in-orblt performance
more realistlcally than the Duane curve and was used in Figure 5-19b.
TABLE 5-2. SYSTEMS TEST AND IN-ORBIT DUANE CURVE
PARAMETER ESTIMATES
Spacecraft
Program I
Prototype
F-t
F-2
F-3
F-4
F-5
F-6
F-7
F-8
No. of
Data Points
33
23
11
15
6
9
13
7
10
Syatems Test in-Orbit
Estimate Estimate
for for
K-Constant (_-slope
5X10 -5
0.512
lX10-10
0.0275
0.00195
0.00041
0.457
0,155
0.146
1-Composite 113 0.126
8
11
Program 2
Prototype
F-1
0.00141
0.0562
-0.61
0.58
-2,03
0.23
-0,06
"0.16
0,61
0.55
0.54
0.19
0.02
0.37
F-2
F-3
Program 3
F-4
F-6
F-6
2-3 Composite
2 insufficient data
6 0.089 0.53
3 9.5X10 -45 -11.36
3 0.209 0.67
2 Insufficientdata
0.0537 I 0.2632
I
Note: 1) All equations are assumed Io be of the form: X =
Estimate E_imate
No, of for for
Data Points K-Constant _-slope
I
N/A NIA I NIA
i
None Insufficient data
12 3.09 0.83
9 1.74 0.82
8 2.29 0.88
12 0.955 0,76
N/A N/A N/A
8 0,309 0.69
3 Insufficient data
45 6,16 0.78
N/A N/A N/A
5 0.00093 0.16
6 0,0933 0.58
None Insufficient data
3 Insufficient data
6 0,000323 -0.05
N/A N/A N/A
18 0,0116 0.26
KT-_
2) Number of data points are not equal to the number of events as some events occurred on the
same day.
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The Duane curve provides a reasonable fit of the systems level teat
failure rates. When this is combined with the visually estimated in-orblt
continuous curve after launch, a 1-easonable approximation of each spacecraft
total profile is obtalned. These profiles have been drawn for every space-
craft on Figures 5-16 and 5-17 for Program i and Programs Z and 3.
respeotlvely. A. convergence of the failure rates at the end of systems test
(and a high correlation) with the in-orbit initial failure rate can he seen.
The _.vo spacecraft which have had no failures in orbit were estimated on the
individual C figures by the method of assuming a failure on I March 1977,
with the additional requirement that e__+i. The use of kfs t as a predictor of
initial in orbit performance and the fact that the in-orbit slopes within each
program are _imilal" (0. 78 for Program I and 0. Z6 for Programs Z and 3)
form a basis for future prediction of in-orbit performance.
A cor_poslte of figures C _vas prepared as shown in Figures 5-20 and
5-ZI for Program i and Programs Z and 3. respectively. These differ from
Figures 5-[6 in that only the v_sua[ly estimated curves are shown.
The varying slopes during the systems test phase are primarily caused
by changes _n the screening effectiveness of the various test phases and by
the total nuITlber of de_ects presented to the systems level screen. This is
an inherent _veakness of the Ouane mode[, l[_wever, as the spacecraft
des[an matures, the unit level and initial systems level tests become more
effective and the cumu|at{ve failure rates assume a more cla,sle Duane
profile.
The definition of a physical n)odel which could provide a basis f_r the
observed Duane trends is considered in Appendix B. A relatively slmple
model is sho_vn to 6it m<_st of the empirical data evahtated in this study.
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The specific test effectiveness and general test effectiveness of
thermal environments were discucsedln Sections 4. 3 and 4.4. The test
effectiveness of system_ thermal vacuum acceptance tests was very low at
7 percent for Program i and 3 percent for Programs Z and 3. A summary of
systems level FP.s is presented in Table 6.1. The test time-to-failure was
determined for each of these systems level thermal vacuum Fits, and a fail-
ure histogram is presented in Figure 6-I. The screening effectiveness of the
environment decreases rapidly with time with most of the failures occurring
in the first 60 hours of test (87 percent).
The relative importance of this acceptance test screen is illustrated
in Figure 6-Z for Program 1 systems thermal vacuum with DCTV excluded.
7'he test effectiveness of the therlnal vacuum environment (7 percent) is a
factor of four less important than the following final ambient tests (27 percent}
and a factor of ten less important than the ;irst year in-orbit. The relatively
low test effectiveness of the thermal vacuum environment may be explained
in terms of the test not inducing sufficient stresses to cause failure, or there
being enough novelty, e.g., changes in environment and operating modes to
cause marginal hardware to fail. A cumulative failure rate curve was pre-
pared, Figure 6-3. for the therma: vacuum Fit data. From Figure 6-3 it is
shown that additional time in thern_al vacuum environment is of little value
because the instantaneous failure rate {_,i / is nearly zero la=+l) after 70 hours.
This is equivalent to a test effectiveness asymptotically approachillg 0.07_.
As shown in Figure 6-Z, the cumulative test effectiveness for Program 1
reaches 0.06 after only 50 hours in test. The data str,nlgly suggests that the
test technique should he improved to add novelty and significantly increase
the test effectiveness relative to the first year in-orbit. Time in the
envir_,nment is n()t necessarily tlle most important factor.
TABLE 6-1, THERMAL VACUUM FR SUMMARY
(SeeTables 3-11 and 3-12)
Thermal
Vacuum
Test Program 1 Programs2 ard 3 Totals
DCTV/ESTV
Systems TV
(_ual
N/A
7
Accept
5
9
12
18
Qual Accept
1 6
0 2
t 8Totals 7 !4 30
6-1
10 n
9
#. 2 -'_
u. 7
2
2
' I-I I--I
* i , Ii i_.0 10 2030 40 BOSO 70 80g01(:_1101201_0 40120 20 _10_0_0
TIME, HOURS
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7. COST EFFECTIVE TESTING
1
i
I
I
The issue of test cost effectiveness is aquestion of value received
balanced against test costs. For a complex communications spacecraft, the
total investment in an in-orbit spacecraft can easily exceed $40 million
(including $20 million for a booster) with an operating revenue on the order
of $40 million per year. Total recurring unit and systems test costs would
typically be less than 7 percent of the spacecraft costs, or approximately
$]. 5 million. Therefore, from a rettlrn on investment viewpoint, it is
apparent that all reasonable test screens should be utilized to ensure _n..orhit
reliability. It also should be noted that the relatively high operating revenues
create a very slgni[[cant launch schedule incentive, particularly for the
initial spacecraft.
Typical recurring cost data for an acceptance test program are shown
in Tables 741 and 7-2. The data are for programs of moderate complexity
with I flight spacecraft and for 8 Dight spacecraft, respectively. The data
are strictly approximations and do not represent actual data foi _ any specific
----program. However. it will be apparent that large variances are possible
without significantly affecting the conclusions. With reference to Table 7-1,
note that the fixed components of unit and systems level acceptance tests are
67 and 76 percent, respectively. Therefore, the basic test plan is the pre-
dominate test cost driver. Hardware problems and failures create only Z0 to
30 percent of the total test cost. However, secondary program stretch-out
c_sts resultiug from systems level problems o_,errlde all test cost c_nsider-
ations by a large factor. The schedule in_plications of the basic test plan are
also obviously imp_,rtant because of the secondary program costs (typically
on the ordel" of SZ5K/day in spacecraft cost and as much as $110t</day of in-
orbit operating rnvenueL Therefore. based on the cost drivers, it seems
clear that all practical s_eps to achieve a near zero-failure eonditi_m at
systems level art! warranted. The optimum approach would be zcro-faihn'es
at both unit and systems level through an effective emphasis on defecl pre-
vention at the subunit level. The test effectiveness of tile Lmit level screens
should also be substantially greater than either the systems test environment
o1" tile in-orbit environment. In addition, the duration of the acceptance test
program should be varied in accordance with the actual failure experience
on the particular set of spacecraft hardware as proposed in section 4.6 of
this report.
For a program with eight flight spacecraft, the relative cost drivers
shift significantly as sho_n_ in Table 7-2, The program stretch-out eo_ts
7-I
TABLE 7-1. TYPICAL RECL_RRING ACCEPTANCE TEST COSTS
(I Flight Spacecraft}
Item
Basic unit tests
Unit rework end retest
due to unit level problems
Unit total
Basic systems test
Systems retest due to
problems
Unit work and retest due
to systems problems
Fixed
200
Dollars in Thousands
Variable
100
Total
200 (67%) 100 (33%) 300 (100%)
750
20O
35
Systems total 750 (76%) 235 (24%) 985 (100%)
Program stretch-out costs 1700
due to systems problems
Program total 1700 1700
Grand total g50 2035 29B5
aS Ratio
1980
2035
Potential savings
If all problems screened
at unit level
If zero-failures achieved
in test program
Maximum permitted
increase in unit ¢;,osts
to achieve zero-failure
at systems level
9;1
are not affectedj but all other cost elements increase proportionately with
quantity of spacecraft. Tile overall effect is to increase the importance of
test costs. CoPrective actions at the subunit level, which restllt it1 l(_wt.r
failure rates, become more highly levered.
13used on an engineering review of the FR data base included in this
study, i_ ie probable that only" a st'null fraction of the failures are readers in
the sense that corrective action is either impossible or not coat effective.
In fact, there are many corrective action paths which do not involve increased
n'lanl)ower. ['or example_ a recent Hughes experiment in an electronics pro-
duction area indicated that the manufacturing defect rate could bc dramatically
reduced by simply assuring rapid feedback of problcmu t¢_ the pem,_m res-
ponsible. It is probable that an aggressive corrective action program to
achieve near-zero failures in both the qualification and acceptance teat pro-
grains would be cost effective.
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TABLE 7-2, TYPICAL RECURRING ACCEPTANCE TEST COSTS
(8 Flight Spacecraft)
Item
Dollars in Thousands
Fixed Veriabte Total
Basic unit tests lEO0
Unit rework and retest 800
due-to unit level problems
Unit total 1600 (67%) 800 (33%) 2400 (100%)
Basic systems test 6000
Systems retest due to 1600
problems
Unit rework and retest 280
due to systems problems
Systems total 6000 (76%) 1000 (24%) 7080 (100%)
Program stretch-out costs 1700
due to systems problems
Program total 1700 1700
Grand total 1600 4380 11 ,gB0
Ratio
Potential savings
If all problems
screened at unit level
If zero failures achieved
in test program
Maximum permitted
increase in unit costs
to achieve zero-failures
at systems level
3300
4380
2:1
Relative t(_ qualification tests, the results sliscusst_cl in section 4,5
of this report indicate that none _f tilt" unit or systems environments art"
very effective as a screen for design problems. The data suggests that at_
increased emphasis on worst-ease analysis, development tc, sts, and otht, r
non_'ecurring activities would be cost effective, h_cittding an at_t.r¢-ssiv¢, co|--
reetive action pro_2rarn, intended to achieve near-zero failures in the, unit
and systems qualification test programs, With such an approach, the oeed fl_r
a qualification spacecraft becon_es dubious. It is probabl*, that des|rnctivt,
tests are not required to achieve an effective screen and the-e is no appar(,_lt
schedule advantage to a seqtleneed development. Therefore, a prohJtli_ht
spacecraft is probably t.lw most cost effective path wherein the first flight
spacecraft is exposed tc_ a more comprehensive test program.
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In summary, a cost effective test program would most likely have the
following attributes:
I) An aggressive corrective action program would be pursued to
achieve near-zero failures in both qualification and acceptance
test programs. Such a program would include standards regard-
ing acceptable defect rates in various categories (e.g., design,
workmanship_ etc. ).
z) The effectiveness of the various test screens would be measured
and an aggressive policy would be pursued to maximize the
effectiveness of the overall test program. The key is to ensure
a high level of novelty in each test period. Time alone is prob-
ably not an effective screen in any given stable environment.
3) In particular, the effectiveness of the unit test environments
would be increased s_gnificantty to ensure a near-zero failure
rate at systems level.
4_ Observed failure rates would be used to predict both systems
level test results and in-orbit performance. The content of the
test program would be varied in accordance with these predictions.
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The test programs considered by this study were extren_ely effective
in ensuring a high level of in-orbit reliability. Only a single catastrophic
problem occurred during almost 44 years of in-orbit operation on iZ flight
spacecraft. This problem was the result of an early wearout phenomenon
which eo_tld not have been screened hy the qualification and acceptance
programs as designed.
The results of this study indicate that in-orbit failure rates are
highly correlated with failure rates observed in the unit and systems test
prograr_s. Further, the data suggest that a test ef£ectlvencss model is more
generally applicable than a Duane extrapolation because of reduced sensitivity
to variations in the test screen effectiveness. With suitably standardized
failure criteria, it is probable that predictions based on observed FRs and
a test effectiveness model can be used to guide the content of a test program
to ensure that the stated in-orbit reliability goals are achieved.
Cost considerations suggest that an aggressive corrective action
program to achieve a near-zero failure rate for all systems level testing
would be cost effective for both qualification and acceptance. V,'ry few
failures are considered to be randu1_ in the sense, that preventive actions _tre
impractical, la g_-neral, test activities at the black box levvl and above
should he considered irlsurance functions+ not screens routinely used to
in*prove produ¢'t reliability.
8. l GENERAL
I) Nortnalization of data bases fr_)m similar programs is fL.asibie;
and when based on elec_remic parts count, ntttltber of units, and
number of diflerent unit types, provides ¢-ontpara})lo progral1_ t_
pro_ t-ate dat%.
2) Approximately ! FR of any type was generated a_ainst t.a¢-h
1_7 electronic parts produ¢:cd on each o[ tile thre¢, progr.,us.
_) Only 68 percent of the l"lh+ were primary, 20 p_,reellt wcr,, int_.-
grathm and/or test (_&'FI induced, and II pt, rccct wcr_, secondary.
Of the I&T l;'[_s, 41 pnrcont wert electrical test errors and
24 percent were eh, ctrica[ over,_trcss. [NT l"|{S l'olllilinvd
essentially ¢onstall_ as progranls matured, al'wl t.v¢,ntualIy ,Lll_,,a:
I
I"r'_ -7 ,_I I
equalled the primary FRS generated on later spacecraft at the
systems level. Increased emphasis on test procedures and safety
practices would have been cost effective in reducing the I&T FRs.
Of secondary FRs, 64 percent were for acceptable out-of=
specification test results. Again. better engineered procedures
would have reduced the FR rates.
4) Z and X were more effective than Yin vibration testing,
and the eclipse simulation was the most significant phase of the
systems level thermal vacuum test (48 percent of all thermal
vacuum FRs).
5) The ambient initial checkout and performance Lests are very
effective with at least 42 percent of all unit and 48 percent of all
systems level FKs being detected at these test phases.
6) As the programs matured, the Jv'Rs generated at both unit and
systems level declined, The Iirst spacecraft has three times as
many /_'Rs as the average of all the subsequent spacecraft. Addi-
tionally, the last spacecraft in any program set has an increased
number of FKs compared with the preceding spacecraft because
of delays which have resulted from unit problems.
7) Workmanship problems dominate the primary FRs (40 percent
of total and 51 percent of acceptant el Sixty percent of all work-
manship FRs are installation and/or assembly errors. Little
evidence of learning in this area was evident. An emphasis
placed on reduction of installation/assembly problems shoukl
result in substantially reduced /c'R rates,
8) Part prol)lems remained essentially constant throughout the test
prngrams at Z2. q percent of all F'Rs. Forty four l:_-rceet of the
qualification and thirty mac percent of acceptance part problems
were caused by manufacturing deficloucics.
9) Subsystenas with high cmlcentrations of electrtnlics (Tb:C and AC_)
}lad a disproportionatt_ly high ilull]l)trr of l.'l{.,t, tk_wer and prctpul-
siou snbsg_tt, n_s had a disprt_portion,ttely high ilttnlit*r el I_-'q ["l(s.
10_ llaLf of all in-orl_it problems _ _.rv dupLi_ atiuas ,_f prcviou._ _,_ t ur-
rcntt's. Fifty-two perteut t)L the uni(tuo Drol)lems wert! dt'si_n_
the majorit 7 of which ermld n,)t hay(, boon rloteeted by the accept-
ance -r qualification test programs a_ designed.
8.2 _UAIIFICATION TFSTING
1) l )at. unit and systt.nls Lov_,t qua[ifitatiem tests wt.l _. fs_)ttnd tt) bt2
n_arginaliy _,ffectivt. in (h.t_.t tins oh, sign d,.fiti_.m-h.s. Approxi-
ntatt!ly 8.4 pt, rtent _,vt, re st I't't-Ilt'd ;it unit h.vcl and 22. _ p_.t'< t.et
at systt'ln,_ ltrvt:[_ for ¢_n t)vt.r_tl[ ('fft'ttivt'm'ss [_f 28.8 pt'rt rnt, t
i
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These results suggest not only that the test techniques should he
improved, but also that greater emphasis should be placed on
subuoit development tests, worst-ease analysis, deslgn review
techniques, etc.
2) Systems level vibration testing is an effective qualification test.
3) In general, systems level tests are more effective for qualifica-
tion purposes than for acceptance purposes.
8.3 ACCEPTANCE TESTING
I) Most vibration related problems are detected during qualification
tests or unit level acceptance tests. Three-axis, systems level
vibration testing is probably not cost effective.
_.) All systems level acceptance thermal tests were only 8 percent
effective. This is probably the result of deficiencies in test
teehnlquc and not strongly related to total test time in the environ-
ment. Virtually all of the failures were detected during the first
60 hours of thermal ve-cuum testing, The effectiveness of the
system thermal environments may be severely constrained by the
inherent limits imposed on temperature ranges and rates of
change,
3} Overall, the acceptance test programs were highly effective in
screening critical defects (99 percent). For all problems, tile
comblncd unit and systems test effectiveness was 87 percent fin.
Program 1 and 73 percent for Programs 2. and _,
8.4 RELIABILITY GROWTH
II Test effectiveness models can be used at b_th unit anti systems
level t¢, eaituatc the populatior of defects and h, l}rediel pc. trot-
manet in s)'sten'*s test and in-orbit, ha*orbit faih_re ;ates tire
strt)ngty cor,'elated with test program results. These prt.tlicti,m_
could l)e nsi_d t(i vary the conteM of the test pi',_grar_l in nec,_rdancp
with reliability requirements.
2) The in-orbit cnrnt:latlve fnihn'e )'ate data oxhll)ils a c,)nsistonl
sh:pe which implies a cl)nstaBt equivalent test el'feellV(,lleSs.
Whe in-_rbit fail.ure rates _enerally decrease with sncco_siv,,
iilen_bet's (if a spacect',"tft series, indic:atinlz significant r, Its?nil%.
_I'tIwth. The cni_'llllat'vc failure r<_lte al the end ,,f .sy._l,,ms los!
is a gliod predictor t,t il%-¢ll'bit porforn=i&llce.
4) The systems test and in-orbit cumulative failure rate data cannot
be accurately combined into a single Duane plot because the slopes
are generally different. The disparity belv_een the slopes sen-
eralIy decreases _,ith successive n_emhers of a spacecraft s_rles.
For a mature design (e.g., quantity greater than 10), it is prob-
able that a single Duane curve could be utilized for extrapolation
purposes.
8.5 COST EFFECTIVENESS
I) The consequences of an in-orbit critical failure are generally too
great to permit significantly reduced testing. Howeverj the test
progralm should be considered a n_a£ter of insurance and not a
technique to achieve reliability growth.
2) 'The n__ost cost effective test prograna will probably be achieved
_hrcmgh aggressive corrective action to achieve a near-zero
failure rate at both unit and systems level. The cost inpact of
schedule delays at the systoros level is particularly significant,
3) A continuing effort is _varranted to 1_neasurs and improve the
screening effectiveness of each environlllent in the test prugran_.
4) Approximately 7(9 percent of all direct test costs are fixed by the
definition of the test pcagra_.
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APPENDIX A. SUMMARY OF /INFORMATION CODES
(A DESCRIPTION OF INFORMATION
OR CODES ENTERED IN
EACH COLUMN)
Code De sc riptlo n
N
F
['
F._R or _.IlZR number entered here. Columns
I and 2 contain a non-U.S, subcontractor code
of IFRs o_ly.
Level- Indicates reporting level where
falhlre occurred, A code is used to indicate
these levels:
Unit (foreign or domestic)
Spacecraft (systems test)
Post- launch (orbit)
Subsystem-- Spacecraft subsystem frml_
which part [ailedj coded:
0 Other (thermal, etc.)
Coinnlunic ations
Z Ant*mn-a
3 P_,wer
4 l)espin control subsystem
5 T&C digital
6 T_C RF"
7 IICS
,_ ._t r ucturt, ] nl_.chanic al
q tlarness a,_ s e mbl'y
Activit)" l')'pe- l)urtng which faLtuee
t)*, t'klrrL_d I k'O¢|i'(|'.
I Acceptance tests (any!
a Qualifi<'atiou tests {an_,)
6 AliKntucot
7 [+iltlll¢'h op¢'l'*_liolXS
+ l.aunch/h,+ost
9 (}rllit
A - I
Column
I0
12 through 14
16 through 18
19
2O
2O
Code
0
I
2
3
4
5
8
9
T
S
A
D
1
2
3
4
5
b
7
q
Description
Test Phase -- In process when failure
occurred, coded:
Inspection
Electrical manufacturing
Mechanical manufacturing
Electrical performance test (first, not-
defined, or last)
IST (first or last)
ESTV/DCTV (electrical shelf or despun
compartment thermal vacuum}
Vibration (slnc or random)
TV/STV (spacecraft (or solar) thermal
vacuum)
Thermal cycle
RCS tests
Unit Part Number (P/N)-- Of failed item.
Part P/N-- Of failed component, if
applicable.
ImFortance Co-de:
Drimary type of failure/anomaly
Test or integration induced
Secondary preblem- no action taken
except NCMR or T[,'I _, close out
Anomaly not verified w/retest
Duplicate of in-orbit problem
Type code for tt.st (_.. inLegration) induced;
I)aruaged wires, heaters, and other h,ads
Electrical test overstress error
}.:loctrical test evrur
l lardwarv handlinq probhuns
Wreng environn*ent imposed
Bad pat't selevtion i:I test
R(:S test t, rror
Tt.st fixture indut eel
Spacoc raft operator error; in-orbit
Iype _-odo for -t,t ondar x problem:
()ut-¢,f- spv_ /i)K
Mt.asurela_,,nl tt,¢ hniqtu, ha¢l/n¢, rt,tt,st
l,.st equipllxt, nt t.rr(ir/rto retest
t
A-£
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I
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Column
ZO ,
(continued)
21 and 22
Z3 and 24
25
27 throagh 51
_3
54
Code
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
De.co ript_on
Mamxfaot_xring problem or assembly
error mulLiple duplications
Test error/no rework
Miscellaneous/no rework
An_malie s/no r crest
Month during which failure occurred.
ol month failure occurred.
Last digit of Year in which failure occurred.
Verbal complement to failure code. Attempt
to achieve a complete description of failure
cause between this verbiage anti failure
c_de of Column 62 and 63.
Symptoms-- Of failure, coded:
Anomaly or specit'icatien variance
Random occurrence
Periodic/inte ru_ittent
}lard failure
NorD_al life or wearout
Not hardware
Visual observation
,bevcrity_ Of failure, coded:
Not critical
Rcwurk to existing paper
Retcst to cxisting paper
[Tle_radat_(m of perf_)rtuance _1' mi,_i,_n
Catastrophic failarc
R_,design har'.hvare or papcr
l_cplac,' failed part
N_t h_:'dwa rc
Not vc rifivd
Op_r,ttiunaily t)v_rt oll]('
A -
Column
57
57
5?
59
Code
0
1
Z
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
1
2
5
4
0
1
3
4
5
6
7
Description
Type code for Workmanship failure:
Installation/as s embly
Test error
Paper error
Bad electrical connection
Accidental handling
Mis Llse
Wrong part used
Damaged wires/coax
Contamination/corrosion
Bad alignment or machining
Type code for Part failure:
Urlk no%vr_
Workmanship
Contamination
Manufacturing process
Design
Type code for _ failure:
No change
Wrong part
EM[
Physical properties
Specification crror
[Jl'O( ass (" 1' r o r
Circtfil design
Mt, t. hanical installathm
/%lllal_ ti_ al _z' ror
I-M__ , niHcnt,tl Conditi(>p-- Attributed tc_ _1'
v>:i_,_n_ at film, :fl" failulm.
(It h_,r _,rhi!
;\mbh,nt
l{,u_doll_
Nine
I lot
C_d,l
|"clip_e (_inullatic.n_
Thc r,,,,, ] / t ranb iti_m / [_Ul 11 [)tl')_V!l
I';M[/I':Mt ,tlltl Slitt[t C]llJh_L"
tl at I iaI t(_n
A- _,

!
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6Z and 63
Code
]
F
X,Y,Z
B
D
A
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
lO
II
12
]3
14
15
16
17
18
19
ZO
21
2Z
23
Z4
25
26
27
Z8
Z9
30
31
3Z
.Description
Test Modifier-- For activity, coded:
Intttal
Final
.axis IX) Y, Z)
Before
Durlr, g
After
Numerics[ portion of _Failure Code
(cause of failure).
Unkn:)wn (failure verified, but cause unknown)
]n process
Cont_.mination (e, g., weld splatter, etc,,
in el_!ctronic part or ECS)
Failure not verified (failure of part not
verJ.f_ed by test/analysis)
Incorrect specification
Suhoxide arc-over
Handling
Test ,)trot (operator error)
Manu[acturfng error (a mistake)
Design inadequate
Electrical overstrcss
Micro cracks
Cracked chip
TherrnaZ overstress
Component (internal)short
Drawings or procedure unclear or incorrect
Wrong part used
Open, missing, or defective weld or solder
joint
Normal and wearout
Inte rrnetallic formation
Excessive and unnecessary _est conditions
High v/indow impedance
Mechanical tolerance
Component (internal)open, missing, or
defective connection
Test equipment malfunction/design
Manu£_tct_ing process
Minor RF anomaly
Paperwork lags spacecraft hardware
Minor out 0£ epecigicatlon eondltion-analysls
unprofitable
llermetic seal not suf|icient
Performance specification too tight
N_ previous failure history -- nonrecurring,
isolated occurrence
ex
7
A-5
Column
62 and 63
(continued)
64
66 through 68
70
72 through 74
75
Code
33
34
35
36
37
38
59
4O
P
S
0
l
2
3
4
0
1
2
Dcscription
Mis wiring
Design subject to environmental parameter
drift
Test equipment or structure unsafe or
subject to huJnan error
Part lost -- no analysis
Inspection error (a mistake)
Checking/inspection insufficient or
non-existent
Design procedure subject to human error
Premature wear out
Letter Portion of Failure Code (corrective
action)
Primary part failure (part caused), Part =
Hi Rei in FPS01000, Basic corrective
action involved a part supplier.
Secondary failure, induced by external
error such as poor workmanship or
design.
Unit Serial Number -- Of failed item.
S/N of Spacecraft upon which unit _'flew"
Time 13t'ration represented as XX.X
(whe,'o .,l_ble)
Time Base (as applicable):
Seconds
flours
Months
Years
Days
Test Cycle, Retest Number (R-), or
multiple ot similar failure.
ProKram Data Set
Program 1
Program 2
Program 3
A-6
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APPENDLX B. AINALYSIS OF SOME SIMPLE
FAILURE RATE MODELS
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The fact that empirical failure rate data appears to fit so well to a
Duane curve (i.e., the plot of failures versus test hours appears to fit a
simple straight line on log-log paper] suggests that the test/failure process
ought to he explainable in terms of a simple analytical model based on at
least an _ntuitive understanding of the process. This appendlxinvesti_ates
the applicability of several such models.
The first model considered here assumes an initial population of
equally vulnerable (equal probability of detection) defects, where the instan-
taneous failure rate is proportional to the number of remaining defects. This
._esults in a failure rate which is an exponential function of time, being
nearly constant initially and approaching zero after several test "time-
constants". The log-loK plot of the cumulative failure rate versus test hours
for this model clearly does not fit a Duane straight line and, therefore, this
simplistic model is rejected.
The second model considered involves a simple sophistication of the
first model wherein the defect population is assumed to he distributed in
terms of probability of detection. That is, in the initial population of defects,
some are easy to detec_ (these are culled out of the population early in the
test cycle), and some are very difficult to detect (these become the jminishing
source of failures later on in the test cycle). This model, even in the ele-
mentary form considered here, produces a fablure rate (failures versus hours)
curve which is vulnerable to a straight line fit on log-log paper, The slope
of the cumulative failure rate curve derived from the model is in the same
range observed in actual ground test and in-orbit failure rate data.
Further sophistication of the model (e.g., in terms of defect detection
probability distributions, varying test e_fectivity, etc.) can provide further
"shaping" of the predicted failure rate curve to more closely match ttae trend_'
::een in the empirical data,
It is concluded from this preliminary analysis that the Duane property
of empiricnl failure rate data can be explained in terms of a simple analytical
model based on an intuitive understanding of the test/failure proce.*s. The
Bol
'/
f
; l ....... "I
key element of this model is the distribution of the defect population in terms
of probabilit 7 of (or vulnerability to} detection. Further development of the
model can provide more complete correepondence with trends seen in the
empirical failure rate data.
EQUAL PROBABILITY OF DETECTION FAILURE RATE MODEL
The first model considered is similar to the one investigated by
Timmins*. ttere we assume the existence of a fixed initial population of
defects which is steadily reduced by successive test screens. The defects
all have equal probabilit 7 of detection, and the test screens all have equal
effectiveness. We further asst_me that the failures which occur in a test
screen (interval} are a constant fraction of the remaining defects. (These
constraints on the model can be removed later, but are imp_sed to keep this
first illustrative example as simple as possible). Let No = the number of
defects in the initial population
N k -- the number of remaining defects after k test screens (or
intervals)
F k = total failures (defects detected) after k test intervals.
= N O - N k
T = time interval of each test screen
a = the fraction of the remaining defects which are detected in each
test interval.
k k = cumulative failure rate
F k
kT
In coco'dance with the above assumptions, the number of defects
ren-_aining after (k ÷ 1) test intervals is given by,
Nk + 1 = Nk " aNk = [1 - a) N k
*Timmins, A.F., "A Study.of RclationshH_ Between Performance in
Systems Tests and Space", Pcoceedint_s of the Institute of Environmental
Sciences, 1975, 1. 17Z
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The solutgon of this difference equation is a simple geometric progression
decrease of the defect population,
N k = N O (1 - a) k
which produces the following relations for F k and k k.
F R =N O [I- (I- a)k]
k'k='aNO--T [ l - (I "a)k]ak
(l]
,J
l
[
1
1
1
1
-I
I
IlL t
Figure B-1 shows a plot of Equation [ or_ Log-log paper for two differ-
ent values of the parameter a (which corresponds physically to test effec-
tivity). From this plot it is clear that the model does not fit a Daane straight
line. As indicated in the figure, the implied failure rate is nearly constant
initialIy, and then approaches zero after many test intervals. The deficiency
stems Lrom the assumption of equal probability of defect detection, which
results in a relatively rapid initial depletion of the defect population, followed
by a diminishing trickle of failures from the depleted popatation.
A contiuuousotime versLou of the same model can be developed as
follows:
lx/ = the initial number of defects
o
N(t) ; the number of remaining defects after t hours
F(t) = N - IN(t) = total faitures over the interval {0, t).
0
Then, iu accordance with the assumpttou that the failure rate is proportional
to the number of remaining defects,
N(t)
where_ v = test effectivity time constant {a parameter characterizing test
circe tivity)
---L's-=_--
J _
rL
t_
.r
I
.o •
IIIII
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Then,
N(t) = N e -t/v
O
F{t) = N ° (l - e"t/T)
and the cumulative failure rate is expressed as,
),_(t) F(t) No h" e't/T]
= t =_- [c_-7_ZY--] {z)
Figure B-2 shows a plot of Equation Z on log-log paper, where "the
normalized quantity (t/v) is used for the time scale. Here we note the same
deficiencies (relative to a Duane fit) as seen in the discrete version of the
model displayed in Figure B-1. That is, the initial failure rate is nearly
constant as the defect population is rapidly depleted, followed by a failure
rate which rapidly approaches zero (slope on log-log paper ffi-l). This
follows from Eguation I since,
_.,z(t)=_r--_) for _ <<I
--e).(+)-':o.C÷) .,
We can also note that the same exponential character would be displayed even
if time is "started 'r after some initial defect depletion period, since this
affects only the initial defect population number, and not the exponential
character of the ensuing failure rate cux've.
DISTRIBUTED PROBABILITY OF DETECTION F.&ILURE MODEL
The deticiencies (relative to a Duane fit) in the previous model are
largely corrected by simply introducing the concept that the defects within
a given population have unequal probability of detection, That is, some are
easy to detect while others are very difficult, requiring mauy test data
samples to detect them. This concept agrees both with the empirical facts
and our intuitive understanding of the test/failure process.
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Decrease of Defect Population with Test Time
I This appruach is pursued mathematically by defining a defect density
function, D(v, t), which is both a function of time (since the defect population
decreases with test time) and a function of the defect vttlnerability to detec-
l tion, v. In this illustrative case we consider the simple density function
shown in Figure B-3. Here the defects within the population are dist,_buted
in terms of vulnerability to detection between the values v = 0 (impossible to
I, detect) and v = I (easy to detect), in this example we also assume that theinitial density is uniform; that is, the initial defect population has equal
density at all values of detection vulnerability. (Further shaping of the result-
i ing failure rate curve is accomplished by introducing a different shape forthe initial density function, e.g., a Gaussian type curve).
Ii We can therefore make the following definitions:
v --the relativ.e vu.nerability of a delect to being detected in test
(resulting zn a failure)
D{v, t) = the defect densit 7 function, which, for any instant t, gives
the number of defects having test vulnerability between v and
v+Av
D(v, O) = N o = the initlal defect density (assumed constant in this
example) at t = 0
N(t) = the total number of defects remaining in the population
At any instant the total number of defects remaining, N(tl, is found byintegrating the density function D(v,t) over the range v = 0 to v = I, i.e..
1
' 1 N(t) -- fo D(v, t)dv (3)
i 1 where, ': O, 1
fo)
I is the total number of defects initially.
The decrease in the defect population {as a result of test acti_n) is
obtained from the differential equation,
! ID(v, t)=-'_ D(v, t) (4)
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where,
v -- test effectiveness time-constant (a parameter of the test processl.
Equation 4 states that the rate of decrease of the defect population at a parti-
cLxtar vulnerability level, v (i. e., the population contained in the vulnerability
range of v to v +Av) is proportional to the test vulnerability of the defects as
well as the number of defects remaining. The solution to Equation 4, giving
the density as a function of time is then,
t
D(v, t) : D(v, 0) • e "v_" (5)
and, since for the pmrticular case being considered, D(v, 0) : N
O
t
D(V, t) : N • e "v7 (6)
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Figure B-3 shows a plot of Equation 6 for several values of t, ilh*s-
trating the resulting decrease of the defect population with test time. As
indicated, the population is depleted rapidly in the region of highest vulner-
ability, and more slowly elsewhere, according to the exponential relation
(Equation 6).
The effect of a change in test effectivity can be accounted for by
introducing one more parameter, _, defined as follows:
[_= relative test effectivity
Thus, in the present case we assun%e a ground test period of duration t o " 3r,
followed by an in-orbit operation period. The relative test effectiveness
of the in-orblt operation is taken to be 13 times the effectiveness of _round
test. 1:he differential equation describing defect pupulation decrease in orbit
is then,
D<v, t) = - [5. v--Z'T"D(v' t) (for t > to ) (71
which has the solution,
_90 o t
. -v'7"p - 1
D(v, t) = N O e -v v (for t > to ) (8)
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F/gate B-3 shows the plot of Equation 8_ Illustrating the further decrease in
defect population for in-orbit operation relative test effectivity of {3 = 0, 5,
Rcstdting Failure Rate
The failure rate implied by the defect population model described
above is formed as follows:
N(t) _ total number of ren_aining defects
where,
!
/ D(v, t) dv (9}N(t}
O
F(t) = N - N(t} -- total failures over the time interval (0, t)
O
{
I
I
kZ(t) =_ -- cumulative failure rate
Then, after carrying out the inte :ation in Equation 9, the cumulative failure
rate (which combines both ground test and in-orbit failures) is determined to
be,
N t" . -X_
L ---';--'-] (lo}
wher e
Figttre B-4 shows a plot of Equation I0 f_;r the specific paramt, ters
chosen for this exatnplc (t o :: 3v, {3 = 0.5). The {ollo_ving observations are
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the character of the failure rate curve and the degree of its
Ground Test Period. Over the ground tc_t period tile average
log-log slope of the curve is roughly -0. 4, which-i-_.-in-t4_
of values typically used with the Duane model. Thus, line ground
test curve can be fit reasonably well _ith a Duane curve (straight
line on log-log paper} having a slope of -0.4. Further,
"straightening" of the curve can be achieved by starting wit|', a
different initial defect distribution function--one that is skewed
toward lower vulnerability rather titan the simple nniform : ,itial
distribution used in this example.
In-Orbit Period. The portion of the curve corrcspondino to
in-orbit operation has a slope which varies fron_ -0. 77 to -0. 96
over the first decade. The average slope is -0. Si, over the
decade, and the curve can be fit very closely by a straight |inc
of that slope. This agrees reasonably well with actual in-orbit
failurc rate data (c.g., b'igure 5-a0) for wlnich the average slope
for the F-] through F-8 data _s apprc_ximatelg -0. 75,
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Moreover, the transition from ground test to in-orbit opcrathm,
which shows up clearly in F'igure 3-4 as a change in sl.ope, can
also be seen in the actual data. For example, the F-3 data
shown p_'eviously in Figure 5-4 shows a sin_ilar slnpe cban_e
at launch,
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